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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF PROBATE
DECREES*
By BERT E. HOPKINS t
WITH improvement in means of travel and communication and with
a more fluid population, conflict of laws problems tend to increase in
number and importance and to call for effective solution. The numerous
conflict of laws problems incident to our federated form, of government
are met and solved in a variety of ways. In the course of political and
legal development many important matters which in an earlier era were
subject to varying state laws have been brought within the control of
federal law. Legal problems remaining subject to state control frequent-
ly are met through wide adoption of uniform legislation which elim-
inates many substantive law conflicts among the states. Where such legis-
lation is not adopted, the problems are met through common law or
statutory conflict of laws rules in the several states. In a few instances
proposed uniform statutory conflict of laws rules have been promulgated.
In certain areas of private law today there are conflict of laws problems
still awaiting effective solution despite the existence of common law con-
flict of laws rules and some state legislation.
Administration of decedents' estates is a case in point. Where a
decedent leaves property in several states, the situation demands an ef-
ficient, unified administration without regard to state lines. It seems im-
probable that federal law will provide such a system of administration
in the foreseeable future, and it is not readily apparent that Congress would
have constitutional power to establish a system of federal administration
for estates extending across state lines. Present uniform acts are frag-
mentary and have not been widely adopted.' Other existing legislation
* This article is a portion of a larger study of decedents' estates in conflict of laws
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Faculty of Law, Columbia Uni-
versity, for the degree of Doctor of Science of Law. See Conflict of Laws in Adminis-
tration of Decedents' Intangibles (1943) 28 IowA L. REv. 422, 613. The writer is indebted
for helpful suggestion and criticism to several members of the Faculty of Law, Columbia
University, and especially to Professor Elliott Cheatham. The authur also has had the
benefit of a perusal of this paper by Professor Thomas E. Atkinson of the University of
Missouri School of Law, draftsman for the Special Committee on Uniform Ancillary
Administration of Estates Act, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.
t Professor of Law, University of Idaho.
1. UIFo WIums Acr, FOPEIGN PROBATED, 9 U. L. A. (1942) 755, adopted in five
states; UNmFo s WiLLs Acr, FoREIGN ExEcuT, adopted in thirteen states, superseded
since 1940 by section 7 of the MODEL ExEcuTION OF W.Ls Act, 9 U. L A. (1942) 277,
adopted in one state. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws now have under con-
sideration tentative drafts of two additional acts relating to powers of foreign personal
representatives and ancillary administration of estates. See HANDLOOK or THE NATIorAL
ComqiarcE OF ComaissioNRas oN Umzroa.m STATE LAws (1942) 237 ef seq.
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is usually likewise incomplete. Common law rules thus far developed are
uncertain and conflicting and usually do not meet the needs of a unified
administration. It is proposed in this essay to explore but one of the con-
flict of laws problems in the administration of decedents' estates, namely,
the extraterritorial effect of probate decrees. The essential question is
whether a single contest or opportunity to contest a will in the United
States is sufficient and conclusive, or whether a contest may be had in more
than one state. The related question of whether a judgment which is
foreign in the international sense should be recognized as conclusive in
this country presents distinctive elements of both law and policy, and will
not be considered here.
The problem here to be considered may be .generalized and stated in
familiar symbolic conflict of laws terms. The property of a decedent is
situated at the time of his death in more than one state. A probate pro-
ceeding is had in one state, F-i, which results in an adjudication either
of testacy or of intestacy. Thereafter, a judicial proceeding takes place
in a second state, F-2, concerning the local property of the same decedent,
and in the second proceeding reliance is placed by one of the parties upon
the F-1 judgment. What recognition or effect will be accorded to the F-i
judgment in the second forum?
Effective analysis of the problem thus broadly generalized requires that
it be broken down in terms of factors considered important by the courts.
It becomes important, for example, to know the state in which the de-
cedent was domiciled at the time of death; whether the property involved
in F-2 is real or personal property; whether the parties to the proceeding
in F-2 were before the court in the F-1 litigation; and what the legislature
in the state of F-2 has provided, not only as to the specific effect of foreign
probate decrees, but also as to local recording or probate of foreign ex-
ecuted wills. Even when this breakdown has been made, the reported
decisions reveal a wide variety of conflicting results supported by equally
conflicting legal theories. The present objective is not primarily to vindi-
cate or to reject any or all of those theories, but to re&xamine the results
obtained through their application. The general criterion which has been
adopted is convenience and expediency in getting the job of probate ad-
ministration done with a minimum of confusion and expense after every
person interested in the estate has had an opportunity to be heard in an
appropriate forum. It may be hoped the effort will be helpful to draftsmen
in the field where legislation is needed.2
2. Improvements in probate practice are under consideration in a number of states,
and the American Bar Association Committee on Probate Jurisdiction and Practice has
concerned itself with the drafting of a model probate code. PROCEEDINGS, ADDESSES AND
REPORTS, SECTION OF REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE AND TRUST LAw, AmImCAN BAR Asso-
CIATioN (1940) 85-87. Other than summary treatment in the textbooks on wills and
conflict of laws, very little discussion of the present subject has appeared in print. More
[Vol. 53 , 221
EFFECT OF PROBATE DECREES
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATION OF "JURISDICTION"
Many of the judicial opinions on the extraterritorial effect of probate
decrees, as will more fully appear, proceed in terms of "jurisdiction" of
the foreign court and of "jurisdiction" of the court in which recog-
nition of the foreign decree is sought. There is grave danger of confusion
in use of a term which, like the word "jurisdiction," is capable of carry-
ing any one of several distinct meanings. Need for some preliminary
clarification is indicated.
In McDouald v. Mabee, Mr. Justice Holmes observed that "The founda-
tion of jurisdiction is physical power .. .. "I But in another opinion,
while recognizing that jurisdiction is founded upon power and that a
sovereign state theoretically could draw a line of fire around its boundaries
and recognize nothing that happened outside, the same justice added sig-
nificantly, "But it prefers to consider itself civilized and to act accord-
ingly." ' Conflict of laws rules are an important part of the civilized
equipment with which a court attempts properly to evaluate the foreign
elements or contacts which are found in a judicial dispute. Those rules,
if prudently formulated, may contribute mightily to efficient handling of
litigation, especially under our federated form of government where the
facts of a great number of cases present a multiple-state aspect. Some-
times the problem is whether there are enough local elements, or the
traditionally proper local elements as compared with the foreign elements
in the cause of action, to warrant the local court hearing the matter at
all; this is a problem of "jurisdiction" in one of the commonly accepted
meanings of that term. Sometimes the problem is whether the court in
deciding the case should forsake its own substantive law rules in favor
of different substantive law rules prevailing in another state with which
the cause of action has important contacts; this is the problem of "choice
of law." Again, the foreign element in the case may be the fact that a
foreign court has already passed upon the same dispute, or some aspect of
it, and the second forum is confronted with the problem of "effect of a
foreign judgment."
We are concerned here essentially with the third of these general conflict
of laws problems and only incidentally with the other two. In most cases
where a court has determined the effect to be given to a foreign probate
than a decade ago Professor Carey treated the matter in a helpful article, :1 Suggested
Fundanental Basis of Jurisdiction wlth Special Emphasis on Judicial Proceedings Affect-
ing Decedents' Estates (1929) 24 ILL L. RPsv. 44, 170.
A draftsman of reform legislation might well consider the related problem, nut
treated herein, of what effect should be given to a judgment of a sister state establishing
construction of a will. See 4 PAGE, WiuMs (3d ed. 1941) § 1606.
3. 243 U. S. 90, 91 (1917).
4. Direction Der Disconto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 267 U. S. 22,
28 (1925).
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decree it has not been troubled at all with its own "jurisdiction" or that
of the foreign court in the sense in which that word is used above. Typi-
cally there is property of the estate in each of the states involved, and the
presence of property within the state is universally recognized as a factor
warranting a local probate proceeding. Nor is the court troubled in the
typical case with the validity of the foreign decree in the state where it
was rendered, which is another and perhaps the basic meaning of "juris-
diction." If such invalidity exists, due to any one of a wide variety of
possible procedural errors, including failure to make proper service of
process, there is indeed an independent and sufficient reason for dis-
regarding the judgment in the local proceeding, on the ground that the
foreign court lacked "jurisdiction." But granting that the foreign court
was competent under its own laws and procedure to enter the judgment
in question, there remains the problem of its extraterritorial effect. This
problem should not be considered one of "jurisdiction" at all in view
of the other burdens of meaning that word is obliged to carry. It is a
question solely of the effect to be given a valid foreign judgment, and
the common practice of attempting a solution in terms of "jurisdiction"
leads only to confusion. In a recent article on Jurisdiction and Foreign
Judgments, Professor Nussbaum observed:
"Where recognition of a foreign judgment is prayed for, it is in
reality not 'jurisdiction' of the foreign court which has to be deter-
mined by the forum. The forum can never confer jurisdiction upon
or take it away from a foreign court. The foreign court derives
jurisdiction from its domestic law and no other. What the forum
actually does amounts to testing, in the forum's own terms, a re-
quirement for granting territorial expansion to the res judicata effect
of the foreign judgment." 5
Professor Nussbaum, however, finds no convenient term to substitute
for the overworked word "jurisdiction" in testing the extraterritorial
effect of foreign judgments. He adopts the terminology of Bartin, French
systemizer of international procedural law, and distinguishes between
jurisdiction in the sense of power of a court to determine a controversy
within the state of the forum, which he calls "direct jurisdiction," and
tests for the recognition of a judgment rendered in another state or
country, which he calls "indirect jurisdiction." This terminology, it is
believed, does not clearly bring out the real importance of the distinction
made. It seems preferable to abandon the term "jurisdiction" entirely
when referring to the problem of extraterritorial recognition of valid
judgments. The distinction itself, however, is significant, and is especially
helpful in evaluating the decisions on extraterritorial effect of probate
5. Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 221,
224-25.
[Vol. 53 : 221
1944] EFFECT OF PROBATE DECREES
decrees; for they frequently contain confusing language about "juris-
diction" when the real problem is not the validity of the foreign judgment
in the state where rendered, but its effect, if any, in a local proceeding.'
The decisions, in fact, reveal two contradictory general theories con-
cerning extraterritorial recognition of probate decrees. One, with ac-
knowledgment to Mr. Justice Holmes, may be called the physical power
theory; the other, which that jurist no doubt would have considered more
civilized, is an application of the maxim niobilia seqnuntiur personani.
The premise of the physical power theory is the undoubted control which
a state may exercise over things within its boundaries. If this power is
fully asserted, it precludes the unified administration of a decedent's estate
where the decedent's property is located in more than one state; and the
property in each state becomes, in effect, a separate estate. Under this
view, whether a proffered will has been admitted to probate or rejected
in another state is a matter of no moment. The foreign decree is entitled
to no recognition, for it cannot bind property outside the state where
entered. A court following this line of reasoning would undoubtedly say
that the foreign court had no "jurisdiction" to enter a decree with respect
to property in this state. It should be noted that implicit in this reasoning
is the assumption that the res, or subject matter of the probate proceeding,
universally recognized as a proceeding in rem, is the property belonging
to the estate and situated within the state.
6. The unfortunate practice of speaking of "jurisdiction" as the power to decide a
controversy in such a way that courts in other states will "generally" regard the judg-
ment as conclusive is not restricted to probate cases. See R.ESTATEhE.tFT, Co:,Fucr oF
LAws (1934) § 42. In 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 37, it is said: "A state may assert
power to decide the title to a thing and what disposition is to be made of it. It may
assert power to make judgments, decrees, and the like, which can be enforced against the
person who is indicated therein; or against his property in general. Such assertion of
power is generally said to be a claim of jurisdiction. If other states and nations generally
regard such judgments, orders, and decrees, as final and conclusive we say that the first
state has jurisdiction. If the other states and nations generally refuse to give any effect
to such judgments, orders, and decrees, we say that the first state has no jurisdiction.
The existence and extent of jurisdiction thus depend rather on what the other states con-
cede than on what the state in question claims. A state may claim much more than other
states are willing to concede. Its claim of jurisdiction may run far beyond its actual juris-
diction as determined by the general consent of the other states and nations." The diffi-
culty with this definition is that, taken with the notion that a judgment is void if there
is no jurisdiction, it leaves the inference that a "claim of jurisdiction" cannot be substan-
tiated. The judgment, however, is not void within the state merely because other states
will not recognize it as valid when brought into question in their courts. Despite that
non-recognition, F-I may effectuate the judgment upon local property as fully as though
it had jurisdiction as there defined. Even with such jurisdiction it could do no more.
Professor Nussbaum shows in detail that this unfortunate use of the word "jurisdiction"
also exists in the Restatement. See RESTATEMENT, COIZFLCr OF LAws (1934) c. 4. See
Nussbaum, supra note S.
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Under the other theory, the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam as
applied to the administration of decedents' estates, it is possible to treat
the entire estate, or at least the movables wherever situated, as a unit
and to suppose it to be located in the state where the decedent was domi-
ciled at the time of death. This maxim, at times, may be difficult of appli-
cation. In the words of Judge Lehmann in Hutchison v. Ross:
"'The maxim mobilia sequuntur personam' cannot always be carried
to its logical conclusion. Practical considerations often stand in the
way. Physical presence in one jurisdiction is a fact, the maxim is
only a juristic formula which cannot destroy the fact." 7
Like other legal fictions, this one was invented for a useful purpose ;8 and,
although declining in importance in other conflict of laws situations, it
retains a considerable following in decedents' estates cases. It is for that
reason that an administration at the decedent's domicile is customarily
referred to as the primary or principal administration, whereas all ad-
ministration proceedings in other states are called ancillary administra-
tions. Where this maxim is given extended recognition in determining the
effect of a foreign probate decree, the court will concede to the state of
decedent's domicile the primary authority or "jurisdiction" to determine
the question of testacy or intestacy, and proceed on the assumption that
the function of the ancillary administration is to assist the court of the
domiciliary administration in the handling of local property. Under this
view, a foreign domiciliary decree will be held entitled to extraterritorial
recognition so as to conlude the question of testacy or intestacy in F-2.
Where this recognition is given, it is probable that the court will consider
the res, or subject matter of the probate proceeding, to be the will itself,
7. 262 N. Y. 381, 388, 187 N. E. 65, 68 (1933).
8. The useful objective to be accomplished by the application of the maxim waq
eloquently expressed by Lord Chancellor Westbury in Enohin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Cas. 1,
11 Eng. Rep. R. 924 (1862), a case involving construction of the will of a British subject
who died domiciled in Russia owning personal property in England. In expressing his
opinion that the English courts of probate and chancery should not have undertaken
a construction of the will, the Lord Chancellor said:
"Now, the utmost confusion must arise if, when a testator dies domiciled in one coun-
try, the Courts of every other country in which he has personal property should assume
the right, first of declaring who is the personal representative, and next of interpreting
the will, and distributing the personal estate situate within its jurisdiction according to
that interpretation. An Englishman, dying domiciled in London, may have personal prop-
erty in France, Spain, New York, Belgium, and Russia; and if the course pursued by
the Court of Probate and the Court of Chancery in the present case should be adopted
by the Courts of those several countries, there might be as many different personal rep-
resentatives of the deceased, and as many varying interpretations of his will, as there were
countries in which he was possessed of personal property.
"It is unnecessary to dwell on the evils which would result from this conflict of juris-
dictions. It was to prevent them that the law of the domicile was introduced and adopted
by civilized nations." Id. at 14, 11 Eng. Rep. R., at 930.
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or the status of testacy or intestacy, rather than the property of the
estate.9
The conflict between the maxim mobilia seqtunitur personnam and the
physical power theory is by no means confined to the problem of the
recognition of foreign probate decrees; it pervades the entire field of con-
flict of laws in administration of decedents' estates. Neither has gained
a clear supremacy-over the other, although it may be worthy of note that
the Restatement of Conflict of Laws has emphasized, where possible, the
application of the maxim. In an introductory note to the chapter on Ad-
ministration of Decedents' Estates, it is said:
"There is another difficulty presented in the problem of adminis-
tration, especially as among the States of the United States. An
estate as a whole is, for practical purposes, a single thing, whether
the items of property which compose it are all within the borders of
one State or are scattered among several. But our States are for
most purposes entirely separate legal sovereignties. It is difficult to
administer an estate as a unit, if that portion of it in each state is to
be treated as a completely separate affair.
"The treatment in this Chapter has emphasized the unitary char-
acter of the administration of an estate. It is believed that this is
in accordance with both the trend of the decisions and administra-
tive practice, and that it is highly convenient. Direct case authority
cannot be cited for all the statements made. But the rules here set
out are supported, it is thought, either by the decisions or by fair
implications from the decisions especially those of the last half
century." 
10
The present inquiry, similarly, is directed toward the formulation of
conflict of laws rules more nearly limiting wills contests to the state of
9. Professor Carey has elaborated these conflicting notions as to the identity of
the res in probate proceedings, which are everywhere conceded to be in rem. See Carey,
supra note 2, at 49. The notion that jurisdiction in rem attaches to the status of testacy
or intestacy finds a ready analogy in divorce cases where it is usual to speak of the marital
status as the res. It seems to the writer unnecessary and confusing to extend the concep-
tion of jurisdiction in rem usually applied to physical property so as to include a relation-
ship or status. The emplanation for this unfortunate terminology would seem to be the
historical distinction in our law between jurisdiction in personam and in rem, and the
desire to sustain a claim to jurisdiction in these cases without the necessity of personal
service of process. It would have been more realistic simply to say that the appropriate
court has jurisdiction to determine status without the necessity of personal service. See
RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTs (1942) § 33. For the view that, although it is not helpful to
label divorce proceedings as proceedings in rem, a divorce decree is more than an ordinary
in personam judgment, and that domicile of the plaintiff is an adequate jurisdictional
basis for the decree so as to require its extraterritorial recognition even in the absence of
personal service upon defendant, see Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion in Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942).
10. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICr OF LAwS (1934) c. 11, 560.
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the decedent's domicile rather than encouraging a separate contest in each
state where property is left. It is not a question of the power or "juris-
dicti6n" each state may assert over property within its boundaries. Rather,
it is a question of how each state, in the exercise of that admitted power,
may contribute to a convenient and unified administration of the entire
estate by taking properly into account an important foreign element in
the case, namely, the fact that a will affecting local property has already
been admitted to probate, or rejected, by a court at the domicile.
Although most of the cases which have given extraterritorial recog-
nition to the domiciliary decree have relied upon the m~axim mobilia
sequuntur personam, it seems unnecessary in justification of that result
to resort to the fictional supposition that local property is situated in the
foreign state. In most instances recognition may readily be justified
through application of familiar principles of res judicata1 This is
especially obvious as to parties in F-2 who were also subject to the juris-
diction of F-1 in personam when the F-1 decree was entered, and as to
property subject to F-1 jurisdiction in rem which was later removed to
F-2. The most difficult situation in which to justify recognition through
principles of res judicata is the case of property at all times in F-2, the
claimants to which were not subject to F-1 jurisdiction in personam.
Even in this situation, however, there is a judicially recognized principle
of res judicata which justifies recognition of the domiciliary decree. This
principle, as phrased in the Restatement of Judgments, is that "In a pro-
ceeding in rem with respect to a status the judgment is conclusive upon
all persons as to the existence of the status." 1 In certain cases it Is said
that a probate proceeding is one in rem to determine the status of testacy
or intestacy, and that a court at the domicile is primarily the appropriate
forum for determination of that status. Although this analogy is not
complete, the issue involved in such a matter as this is similar to that
involved in a question as to the status of an individual, and, like a ju-
11. For a recent statement of res judicata principles see RESTAT!EMENT, JUDGMENTS
(1942) c. 3. Although the Restatement deals primarily with the effect of a judgment in
the state in which it was rendered, and only incidentally with its effect in other states, the
principles of res judicata are applied generally when a foreign judgment is in question.
In most instances the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution requires their appli-
cation, but, where it does not, they may be applied under the conflict of laws rules in F-2.
12. RESTATEmENT, JUDGmENTS (1942) § 74. In a comment upon this section it is
stated: "Where in a proceeding for the creation or termination or judicial determination
of a status a competent court has after proper notice given a valid and final judgment, the
judgment is binding on all persons in the world as to the existence of the status. The
judgment is not subject to collateral attack by anyone, unless the judgment was void
because the court did not have jurisdiction over the status or was not competent to render
the judgment or there was a failure to give proper notice and opportunity to be heard. As
far as the status is concerned, the judgment is binding not only on persons who were
subject to the jurisdiction of the court which rendered the judgment, but also on persons
not personally subject to the jurisdiction of the court."
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dicial determination of status, a judicial determination of testacy or of
intestacy by a court at the domicile may be deemed binding on persons
not parties to the proceedings. The cases in which this analogy is accepted
make no distinction as to the type of foreign domiciliary decree involved.
Probate in common form, although strictly ex parte in nature, is a judicial
establistment of testacy, and courts in other states may accept it as con-
clusive unless or until it is set aside in the appropriate proceeding in the
state where made. Many F-2 courts, in fact, have used the term "e.r
parte probate" loosely so as to include not only probates in common form,
but also solemn form F-1 probates, with citation of parties. where neither
the property in contest in F-2 nor the contestants in F-2 were actually
before the F-1 court. The usage, although it combines two matters which
at times might need to be distinguished, will be adopted in this discussion
because of the convenience of having a single term to identify F-1 pro-
bates, regardless of type, where neither property nor contestants in F-2
were before F-1. The next section is concerned primarily with the appli-
cation of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution to situations
of this kind.
EFFECT OF THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
The leading case in this country giving an extended application to the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personant, so as to require full extraterritorial
recognition of a domiciliary probate decree, is Crippen z,. Dexter,"3 decided
in Massachusetts in 1859. In his opinion in that case, Chief Justice Shaw
sought to place behind the maxim the compulsion of the full faith and
credit clause of the Federal Constitution. 4 His reasoning, in fact, was
broad enough to include non-domiciliary foreign decrees as well as domi-
ciliary ones, although a domiciliary decree was actually in question. The
decedent died domiciled in Connecticut owning Massachusetts land. The
will was probated in common form in Connecticut, and then offered for
probate in Massachusetts upon authenticated copy of the foreign probate
as permitted by statute. The heir at law, residing in Massachusetts, had no
notice of the Connecticut proceeding; and he objected to the Massachusetts
probate on a number of grounds, including undue influence in the procure-
ment of the will, lack of testamentary capacity, and irregularities in the
Connecticut proceedings. In denying the privilege of contest, the Chief
13. 79 MAass. 330 (1859).
14. U. S. CoNsT. ART. IV, § 1: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." See 28 U. S. C. A. (1928) § 687.
The possibility should be noted that Congress might use the power granted in this clause
to prescribe specifically the extraterritorial effect of probate decrees, improbable though
such action may be.
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Justice reasoned that the judgment of a probate court allowing probate
of a will, a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the rights of all persons
interested in the property, though not named as parties. This disposed of
the heir's contention that the Connecticut proceeding was invalid because
the statutes there did not provide for notice to the heirs. The Chief
Justice said that making proof of a will in a court having "jurisdiction"
of the subject matter determines the status, or condition, of the deceased's
estate. It must be settled as an estate, testate or intestate. The establish-
ment of one necessarily excludes the other. The Connecticut decree estab-
lished the fact of testacy, and that decree was conclusive of the matter in
Massachusetts by virtue of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal
Constitution. The local court could inquire only into the due authentica-
tion of the foreign record, the jurisdiction of the foreign court, and
whether there was local property upon which the will could operate if
admitted. It was suggested also that perhaps actual fraud in obtaining
the foreign probate might be open to question.
Since this decision has had a considerable influence in other states, it
seems advisable to bring out another factor in the decision. The Massa-
chusetts statutes permitting probate on authenticated copy of a foreign
probate proceeding made no specific provision as to the grounds, if any,
upon which a contest might be filed, but they did provide that a will exe-
cuted abroad should have the same effect as a domestic will if executed in
accordance with the laws of the state where executed. This is a modifica-
tion of the common law choice of law rules under which the validity of a
will of personal property is governed by the law of the decedent's domicile
and a will of real property by the law of the situs. The problem of choice
of law, as indicated above, is analytically distinct from the question of
effect of foreign judgments, but the two may become closely related for
practical purposes. If, for example, the common law rule as to personalty
prevails at the forum and the court is to test the validity of a non-resident's
will under the substantive rules prevailing at the domicile, it is probable the
court will accept a domiciliary probate decree as an authoritative interpreta-
tion and application of that law. On the other hand, if there is real prop-
erty rather than personalty involved, and again the common law rule is
assumed, the foreign domiciliary probate decree will give little or no indi-
cation whether the formal requirements of the local Wills Act have been
complied with, and that question would be open. But in all probability,
the court will not confine the contest to questions of formal validity under
local statutes. Less localized problems such as testamentary capacity, un-
due influence, and forgery of the will may be held open to investigation
even though fully litigated at the domicile. Thus, choice of law rules are
likely to have an important influence upon the effect which will be given
to a foreign probate judgment, and in Crippen v. Derter the statute estab-
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lishing reference points in addition to the law of Massachusetts for rules
of law under which a will of Massachusetts land could be held valid,
namely, the law of any state in which the will was executed, served to
broaden the outlook as to the effect of a foreign probate decree. Chief
Justice Shaw said:
"This statute does not in terms apply to a will made and proved in
any other state or country; but with other acts of legislation it tends
to confirm a general course of policy, to consider one effectual
probate of a will, whether in our own or in a foreign state, according
to the laws of such state, as conclusive and effectual, to all pur-
poses." 15
Thus there are in this opinion two distinct grounds or reasons for the
extraterritorial recognition of the Connecticut probate, and they should
not be confused. One is a local Massachusetts policy, confirmed though
not required by its statutes, to encourage a unified administration by
adopting a conflict of laws rule recognizing foreign probate decrees as con-
clusive, even though a Massachusetts decree might not receive similar
recognition elsewhere. The other is the supposition that once a will has
been probated in any state having jurisdiction to do so, either because of
property or domicile of the decedent within the state, the question of testa-
cy or intestacy is concluded in every other state under the compulsion of
the Federal Constitution. Had the latter argument received the sanction
of the United States Supreme Court, the problem here under consideration
would have been reduced to a relatively simple rule of constitutional law
rather than have remained a confused and difficult problem of conflict of
laws °. But the Supreme Court, in fact, has never yet enforced the rule of
Crippen v. Dexter as a rule of constitutional law; it has so far left each
state free to assert its full power over local property in disregard of for-
eign probate judgments, if it sees fit to do so, although in most of the cases
where the constitutional issue was raised, there was also a failure to com-
ply with the filing, ancillary probate, or other procedural requirements of
15. Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330, 332 (1859).
16. There has been much excellent discussion of federal constitutional control over
conflict of laws. See, e.g., Dodd, The Power of the Supreme Court to Reqc, Stale Deci-
sions in the Field of Conflict of Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. RE%. 533; Hilpert and Cooley,
The Federal Constitution and the Choice of Law (1939) 25 NVAsm. U. L. Q. 27; Ross,
Has the Conflict of Laws Become a Branch of Constitutional Law? (1931) 15 Muiu.
L. REV. 161; Smith, The Constitution and the Conflict.of Lws (1939) 27 GEo. L. J. 536.
Although those articles are concerned primarily with constitutional control over state
decisions on choice of law problems through a more extended application of the due pro-
cess and full faith and credit clauses, the possibilities visualized are equally pertinent to
questions of the effect of foreign judgments. The Supreme Court could undoubtedl)
clarify the extraterritorial effect of foreign probate decrees by adopting the reasoning of
Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (1859), but its past decisions on the subject give no
indication that it is likely to do so.
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F-2.1 7 Several of these Supreme Court decisions involved conflicting ad-
judications as to decedent's domicile so that each state claimed to be the
proper place for primary administration."' In each case the Court re-
jected the argument that the full faith and credit clause required that the
first such adjudication be respected in the second state. The reasoning was
succinctly stated in one of the cases as follows:
"Now a judgment in rein binds only the property within the control
of the court which rendered it . . as a judgment in rem it merely
determined the right to administer the property within the jurisdic-
tion, whether considered as directly operating on the particular things
seized, or the general status of assets there situated." 19
The Court also relied upon the well established rule that the full faith
and credit clause does not preclude an inquiry into the "jurisdiction" of
the court which rendered the judgment in question. This rule is sometimes
applied in testing the validity of the foreign judgment in the state where
rendered, since, of course, a judgment invalid where rendered is entitled
to no credit elsewhere. But as used here the rule may assume the validity
of the foreign judgment where entered; the question is merely whether
the second forum will recognize it as binding upon local property.20
Another Supreme Court case bears out in inverse fashion the applica-
tion of the full faith and credit clause to the "physical power" theory of
extraterritorial recognition. In the cases discussed above, the Court re-
fused to compel the state of the situs to respect a foreign adjudication;
in Tilt v. Kelsey 21 the court required that an adjudication at the situs be
17. Darby's Lessee v. Mayer, 10 Wheat. 465 (U. S. 1825), holds that a Maryland
probate record is not required to be accepted under the full faith and credit clause as
evidence of title in an ejectment action in Tennessee; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat.
192 (U. S. 1825), holds that no claim to Ohio lands could be founded upon a will pro-
bated in Pennsylvania but not probated in Ohio; accord, Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S.
608 (1883). In Blount v. Walker, 134 U. S. 607 (1890), a will exercising a power of
appointment was probated at the domicile in North Carolina, and later, exemplified
copies were filed in South Carolina where land subject to the power was situated; it was
held that the full faith and credit clause did not preclude South Carolina from determin-
ing the validity of the will under its own laws, even though it was assumed the will was
valid in North Carolina as to property there. In Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900),
the domiciliary decree construed a will as having accomplished an equitable conversion
of land wherever situated, but it was held that the courts of another state where a por-
tion of the land was situated did not deny full faith and credit when they placed a con-
trary construction upon the will.
18. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343 (1942) ; Baker v. Baker, Eccles Co.,
242 U. S. 394 (1917); Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214 (1900); Thormann v. Frame,
176 U. S. 350 (1900).
19. Thormann v. Frame, 176 U. S. 350, 355 (1900).
20. The uncertainty as to situs of intangibles for purposes of ad!ministration has been
discussed by the present author elsewhere. See Hopkins, Conflict of Laws in Admhids-
tration of Decedents' Intangibles (1943) 28 IOWA L. Rav. 422, 613.
21. 207 U. S. 43 (1907).
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respected when challenged elsewhere. The testator had lived both in New
Jersey and in New York; his domicile at time of his death was in dispute.
The will was probated in New Jersey as a domiciliary proceeding. The
bulk of the estate consisted of bank deposits and other credits in New
Jersey, and stock in New Jersey corporations. Whether any of the proper-
ty was situated in New York at the time of death does not clearly appear
from the opinion; but, in any event, it was all brought under the possession
and control of the executor in the New Jersey proceeding and distributed
there. Thereafter, a New York proceeding was instituted for the collection
of a succession tax, and upon a finding that the testator was a resident
of New York the tax was imposed. The executor carried the case to the
United States Supreme Court claiming a denial of full faith and credit to
the New Jersey proceeding. The Court held that, while that proceeding
was not conclusive in New York on the question of domicile, it was con-
clusive so far as property in New Jersey was concerned; under New Jersey
law the property there had been distributed free from the claims of credi-
tors or others, whether parties to the proceeding or not, and for the New
York court now to attempt to assert a lien upon such property or to
establish a personal liability upon the executor or distributees would be a
denial of full faith and credit to the New Jersey judgment.
These cases make it clear that the Supreme Court has adopted the physi-
cal power theory, rather than the maxim moilia sequuntur personanh, in-
sofar as the full faith and credit clause is applicable in determining the
extraterritorial effect of probate decrees. As to property within the terri-
torial limits of F-1 when the decree was entered, full faith and credit is
required elsewhere. As to property not within those limits, the full faith
and credit clause has no application, at least to the extent the F-i decree
operates in rem, which is the situation here under consideration. The
possibility of constitutional compulsion as to persons who were subject to
F-1 jurisdiction in personam will be considered in the next section.
As long as the Supreme Court continues to interpret the full faith and
credit clause in such a way that each state may disregard the probate
decrees of sister states in dealing with the decedent's local property, any
state judgment giving extraterritorial recognition to a foreign probate
decree must rest upon a local conflict of laws rule rather than upon con-
stitutional compulsion. This fact has been fully recognized in the great
majority of state cases in which the full faith and credit clause has been
an issue, and courts have asserted full dominion over local property,
both real and personal, in disregard of foreign decrees. -" Nowhere is the
22. See Frederick v. Wilbourne, 198 Ala. 137, 73 So. 442 (1916) ; State ex re. Att'y
General v. Wright, 194 Ark. 652, 109 S. NV. (2d) 123 (1937) (full faith and credit re-
quired where property was all in F-1 rather than at the forum); Schweitzer v. Bean,
154 Ark. 228, 242 S. WV. 63 (1922) ; Selle v. Rapp, 143 Ark. 192, 220 S. AV. 662 (1920) ;
In re Reynolds' Estate, 217 Cal. 557, 20 P. (2d) 323 (1933); Foster v. Kragh,
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rationale of these decisions more clearly stated than in a Rhode Island
decision, a contemporary of Crippen, v. Dexter; the court stated with ref-
erence to a sister-state decree:
"'Full faith and credit' is given to it abroad, when the same faith
and credit is given to it which it has at home; and that is, that it is
to be conclusive evidence of the validity of the will, as affording title
to things within the jurisdictional limits of the court at the death of
the testator, whether such title comes in contest within or without
those limits; but, de jure, no evidence whatever of title to things
not then within those limits." 23
Early state decisions reaching a contrary result through a false reliance
upon the full faith and credit clause have been largely overruled or aban-
doned.2 4 In a few decisions it has been supposed that full faith and credit
is required to be given to a domiciliary decree as to personal property
wherever situated, 2r but not as to real property. This distinction results
from confusion of the choice of law problem with that of the effect of
foreign judgments, and the spurious supposition that since, under the
common law rule, disposition of personal property on death depends upon
the law of the domicile, a decree of the domiciliary court must be respected
as to personal property in other states. But, as pointed out above, the
United States Supreme Court has not embraced the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam as a rille of constitutional law as to either type of
107 Colo. 389, 113 P. (2d) 666 (1941); New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 16 A. (2d) 772
(Del. 1940), aff'd, 315 U. S. 343 (1942) ; Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 198 So. 215
(1940) ; Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218, 60 S. E. 529 (1908) ; Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill.
243, 93 N. E. 145 (1910); Hofferd v. Coyle, 212 Ind. 520, 8 N. E. (2d) 827 (1937) ;
Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592 (1897) ; Sul-
livan v. Kenney, 148 Iowa 361, 126 N. W. 349 (1910); Hines v. Hines, 243 Mo. 480,
147 S. W. 774 (1912); Keith v. Johnson, 97 Mo. 223, 10 S. W. 597 (1889); The Trust
Co. of New Jersey v. Spalding, 125 N. J. Eq. 66, 4 A. (2d) 401 (1939) ; Nelson v.
Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324, 15 Atl. 375 (1888) ; In re Harriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 208
N. Y. Supp. 672 (Surr. Ct. 1924), aff'd without opinion, 216 N. Y. Supp. 842 (App. Div.,
fst Dep't 1926) ; Richards v. Huff, 146 Okla. 108, 293 Pac. 1028 (1930) ; Bowen v. John-
son, 5 R. I. 112 (1858) ; Kirkland v. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1922) ; Wal-
ton v. Hall's Estate, 66 Vt. 455, 29 Atl. 803 (1894) ; Frame v. Thormann, 102 Wis. 653,
79 N. W. 39 (1899).
23. Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 112, 118-19 (1858).
24. Doe v. Roe, 31 Ga. 593 (1860), overruled by Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218,
60 S. E. 529 (1908); Harris v. Harris, 61 Ind. 117 (1878), overruled as to land in
Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592 (1897) ; Hofferd
v. Coyle, 212 Ind. 520, 8 N. E. (2d) 827 (1937) ; Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S.
W. 296 (1899). But see Kirkland v. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 388, 248 S. W. 302 (1923);
Walton v. Hall's Estate, 66 Vt. 455, 29 Atl. 803 (1894) ; Ives v. Heirs of Salisbury, 56
Vt. 565 (1883).
25. Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592 (1897)
Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S. W. 296 (1899); see Dibble v. Winter, 247 Il1, 243,
93 N. E. 145 (1910).
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property, and most of the few states which persist in the contrary view
likewise make no distinctions as to kind of property involved." The ra-
tionale of this minority group of cases differs slightly from that of Crippen
v. Dexter.17 In that case Chief Justice Shaw seems to have supposed that
the Constitution required full faith and credit be given to any sister-state
decree whether domiciliary or merely founded upon the presence of prop-
erty in the state, whereas these decisions are restricted to domiciliary de-
crees. The reasoning may be illustrated by a recent Texas decision in
which the testator died owning real and personal property situated in both
California and Texas. A will was probated in California in what pur-
ported to be domiciliary proceedings. Thereafter, in a proceeding in Texas
for the probate of the will on authenticated copy of the California record,
Texas claimants to the estate, who had no actual notice of the California
proceedings,2s contested on the ground the will was a forgery. In holding
that the full faith and credit clause prohibited the contest, the Texas
Supreme Court said:
"It is fairly well settled by the weight of authority in this country,
that jurisdiction of the original probate of a will is possessed ex-
clusively by the courts of the state where the testator was domiciled
when he died. When the will is regularly probated there, the consti-
tutional provision under consideration requires all sister states to
give full faith and credit to the order of probate as verifying the
instrument. In such a case, the question of authenticity of the in-
strument would be res adjudicata; but the question as to the legal
effect of the instrument would not be." 20
Another leading state case of the minority group illustrates a further
confusion of the choice of law problem with that of effect of foreign
judgments in determining the effect of the full faith and credit clause.
26. Kurtz v. Kurtz's Estate, 169 Md. 554, 182 Atl. 456 (1936) ; State ex rel. Ruef v.
District Court, 34 Mont. 96, 85 Pac. 866 (1906) ; Hopper v. Xicholas, 105 Ohio St. 292,
140 N. E. 186 (1922) (full faith and credit was required of a foreign decree fi.ing domi-
cile, but case is explainable on principles of res judicata since all persons interested in
the estate had appeared in F-1, waived service, and consented to probate); Grignon v.
Shope, 100 Ore. 611. 197 Pac. 317 (1921) ; Holland v. Jackson, 121 Te. 1, 37 S. NV. (2d)
726 (1931); Hodge v. Taylor, 87 S. AN. (2d) 533 (Te. Civ. App. 1935).
27. 79 Mass. 330 (1859).
28. The Texas Supreme Court made no reference to the fact that the California
proceeding was an ex parte probate as herein defined in which citation of interested par-
ties was made by publication; this fact appears from the opinion of the Court of Civil
Appeals, Holland v. Jackson, 19 S. AV. (2d) 428 (1929), and is important in evaluating
the decision of the Supreme Court. It means that the decision can not be sustained on
the principle of res judicata in personam as would be the case had the Texas claimants
appeared in the California proceeding; it stands squarely for the untenable proposition
that adherence to the ma.xim iobilia sequuntur personam as applied to cx parie F-1
probate decrees is compelled by the Federal Constitution.
29. Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 5, 37 S. AV. (2d) 726, 727-28 (1931).
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Montana statutes had modified the common law choice of law rule so as
to admit to probate in Montana on authenticated copy of foreign probate
a will executed according to the law of the place of execution, or accord-
ing to the law of the testator's domicile, or according to the law of Mon-
tana. A will probated in California, the domicile, was offered in Montana
pursuant to these statutes, and was contested on grounds of undue in-
fluence, fraud, and want of testamentary capacity. The Montana Supreme
Court held that the full faith and credit clause precluded the contest.a"
The decision rested in part upon construction of the Montana statutes, and
might well have rested there exclusively. But a will originally admitted in
Montana was subject to contest within a year after probate, and the statute
provided that a will admitted on authenticated copies of foreign probate
should have the same force and effect as a will first admitted in Montana.
To overcome this difficulty the court reasoned that since the California
judgment was conclusive in the state where rendered it must be considered
conclusive in Montana even within the year after probate; otherwise, the
full faith and credit clause would be offended. In answering the argument
that the California court had no jurisdiction over Montana real estate,
which is subject solely to the law of the situs, the court indulged in the
non sequitur that, granting this to be true, the Montana statutes having
established additional tests for validity in accordance with the rules pre-
vailing at the domicile, a domiciliary probate decree is entitled to full faith
and credit under the Federal Constitution. While the result reached in
this case would seem desirable, it should rest upon a local conflict of laws
rule as to the effect to be given to a foreign judgment rather than upon a
spurious constitutional compulsion.
EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA
In the discussion thus far, little attention has been given to the dif-
ference in effect of the doctrine of res judicata depending upon whether
the F-1 judgment may be permitted to operate in personam or must oper-
ate strictly in rem. Most of the cases heretofore discussed involved F-1
judgments founded upon probate proceedings to which the contestants
in the F-2 proceeding were not parties, and in which their only notice,
if any, was by publication. Fewer cases are to be found in which the
parties to the F-2 proceeding were before the court in the prior case. The
fact is, however, that a probate decree may be permitted to operate as a
judgment in personam as to those who are parties to the proceeding and
who appear therein or are properly served wtih process within the state.
This is not the place for an extended discussion of the difference be-
tween jurisdiction in personam and in rem, and whether that difference is
30. State ex rel. Ruef v. District Court, 34 Mont. 96, 85 Pac. 866 (1906).
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well founded on logical and philosophical grounds.3' It is a distinction
well understood and acted upon by the legal profession, and our courts
have long utilized it to determine and establish a wider range of legal regu-
lations as to persons actually before the court or properly represented there
than is considered permissible where jurisdiction over the controversy
rests alone on the presence of property within the territorial limits of the
court. Our question is whether the courts, pursuant to that distinction,
give to probate judgments a wider extraterritorial recognition in cases
where the parties to the F-2 proceeding were also before the F-1 court, so
that the F-1 judgment may properly be said to operate in personam, than
would be given to an F-1 decree of the type herein referred to as e:, parte.
One of the prime requisites to application of the res judicata principle
is identity of issues. For that reason, it is readily seen that a contest inter
partes on a question of formal validity under the local Wills Act does not
conclude the parties in a second contest in another state whose laws pro-
vide different formal requirements as to property there. The Wills Acts
differ from state to state concerning details as to form of wills and the
ceremony of their execution. These differences relate to such matters as
permissibility of nuncupative and holographic wills, place of testator's
signature, number and competency of witnesses, order of signing, and the
like. Cases in F-2 involving such issues of formal validity may be con-
veniently distinguished from those in which less localized issues are pre-
sented, such as testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, or forgery,
which may be termed, for convenience, essential validity. On issues of
essential validity the legal standards of the various states are likely to be
substantially alike, and the cases usually turn on disputed facts. Similarly,
in cases where the decedent's domicile is in dispute the issue is typically
one of fact. Under those circumstances the F-2 court usually will treat
the issues in F-1 and F-2 as identical and preclude a second contest be-
tween the same parties. But the F-2 court may, however, adopt the power
theory in extreme form, disregard the principles of res judicata, and
deny that F-1 has "jurisdiction" to determine anything with respect to
31. In one of his brilliant critical articles, 7he Jurisdiction of Sot'creig: States and
The Conflict of Laws (1931) 31 CoL L. REv. 368, Professor Cook demonstrated that basic
postulates on jurisdiction, in the conflict of laws sense, all tacitly assume another postu-
late, i.e., that jurisdiction can be exercised separately over persons and over things, and
that when exercised over one it does not involve at the same time an exercise of juris-
diction over the other. The fallacy Professor Cook finds in this assumption may be
illustrated by his example of a foreclosure action concerning land of a nonresident; it is
impossible to create additional rights in the mortgagee with respect to the land without
altering the rights of the nonresident mortgagor. Professor Cook's pustulate is that rights
which relate to things are always rights against other persons, nut against the thing said
to be owned. See also REsTATE1ENT, PROPEaR (1936) intruduct,,ry note, 3: "The
word 'property' is used in this Restatement to denote legal relations betveen persons with
respect to a thing."
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property subject to F-2, even though the parties fully litigated the matter
in question in F-1.
Decisions in a few states have, in fact, adopted this extreme view,82
The rationale may be illustrated by a Delaware case. The testatrix died
domiciled in Maryland owning Delaware real estate which she devised to
the defendant. The will was contested in Maryland and rejected for un-
due influence. The heir at law, who was also appointed administrator by
the Maryland court, then brought ejectment against the devisee. The de-
visee had not been a formal party to the Maryland contest, but he was
present there and testified in support of the will, and it was contended that
he was represented by the executor who propounded the will, and he was
estopped by the Maryland judgment from claiming validity of the will.
In holding that the issue was not res judicata in Delaware the court said:
"For the purposes of this case, it is wholly immaterial whether the
defendant in said action of ejectment was or was not a party to the
said proceedings in Maryland. While the Maryland court had full
jurisdiction to find that the alleged will, so far as it related to testa-
tor's personal property and her lands in Maryland, was procured by
fraud and undue influence, and that she was not of sound and dis-
posing mind and memory, it had no jurisdiction whatever to make
a conclusive determination as to these facts, or any other facts touch-
the validity or invalidity of the paper, so far as the same relates to
the title to the land in Delaware. The defendant therefore is not
estopped from denying in said action any or all of said findings of
the Maryland court." 8
This extreme application of the power theory, however, must be re-
garded as a minority view. Most of the cases have considered contested
issues, or issues necessarily passed upon though not contested, as to de-
cedent's domicile or essential validity of a will, res judicata in F-2 on the
32. Frederick v. Wilbourne, 198 Ala. 137, 73 So. 442 (1916) (involving probate of
inconsistent wills in different states; decision turns, in part, on fact that probate
in F-2 preceded in time the contest in F-i) ; Pritchard v. Henderson, 2 Penn. 553, 47
Ati. 376 (Del. 1900) ; McCartney v. Osburn, 118 Ill. 403, 9 N. E. 210 (1886) (construc-
tion of will); Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1919); In re Gaines'
Will, 84 Hun. 520, 32 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1895), aff'd without opinion, 154 N. Y.
747, 49 N. E. 1097 (1897) (issue of forgery) ; In re Neumayer's Estate, 168 Misc. 173,
5 N. Y. S. (2d) 331 (Surr. Ct. 1938) (issue of testamentary capacity).
33. Pritchard v. Henderson, 2 Penn. 553, 563-64, 47 Ati. 376, 379 (Del. 1900). Cf.
Roberts v. Bathurst, 112 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940) (holding litigation by sole
legatee binding upon representative of estate who was not a party). The question of con-
clusive effect of a judgment as to one not a party of record or privy to such a party, but
who participated in the suit or was represented therein under the class suit doctrine, is too
large for treatment here. For an extensive recent note on the subject, see (1942) 139 A.
L. R. 9. The problem has conflict of laws significance, however, because of the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. See discussion of Riley v. New York Trust
Co., 315 U. S. 343 (1942) at pages 243-46 in!ra.
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theory that the judgment operates in personam as well as in rem upon
all persons properly before the F-1 court.Y' Considerations of policy
and convenience point rather obviously to a preference for the majority
view in this situation. One may suppose the case of a testator of doubtful
testamentary capacity who dies owning property in several states and leav-
ing heirs and devisees with a penchant for litigation; there is little to
recommend a rule which invites a separate contest in each of the states
where property is to be found.
There is a probability that this majority view need not rest alone on
considerations of policy, but that compliance with it is required by the full
faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution. So far as the author
has been able to discover the United States Supreme Court has not passed
directly upon the point; but a number of its recent decisions on the sub-
ject of res judicata clearly show an expanding application of that principle,
particularly as to issues of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Those
decisions have provoked much comment in legal periodicals, and even
a speculation that the strong policy of res judicata expressed in those
cases demands that a determination of domicile in a probate proceeding
be accorded full faith and credit elsewhere as to persons who were parties
to the prior suit. 6 Although not all of those recent cases on res judicata
of an issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter actually turned on the
full faith and credit clause, their persuasive application by analogy to the
problem under consideration is apparent when it is recalled that at several
points in the administration of an estate the decedent's domicile is a matter
of crucial importance and that it is frequently said to be "jurisdictional
34. Willetts' Appeal, 50 Conn. 330 (1882) (decedent's domicile); Loewenthal v.
Mandell, 125 Fla. 685, 170 So. 169 (1936) (decedent's domicile); compare Torrey v.
Bruner, 60 Fla. 365, 53 So. 337 (1910), with Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517, 193 So.
215 (1940) ; Thomas v. Mforrisett, 76 Ga. 384 (1886) (decedent's domicile). Quinton v.
Kendall, 122 Kan. 814, 253 Pac. 600 (1927) (construction of will); Mfurphy v. Mackey,
135 Md. 611, 109 AtI. 326 (1920) (validity of will); Dalrymple v. Gamble, 63 Md. 523,
13 At]. 156 (1888) (testamentary capacity, undue influence, and construction of will);
compare In re Fischer's Estate, 118 N. J. Eq. 599, 180 At. 633 (1935) (decedent's domi-
cile), with The Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Spalding, 125 N. J. Eq. 66, 4 A. (2d) 401
(1939) (res judicata as to persons not represented before the F-1 court denied) ; In re
Barney's Will, 94 N. J. Eq. 392, 120 At. 513 (1923) (issue of testamentary capacity, and
executor proponent in F-i held to represent legatees so as to bind them in F-2, although
they were not formal parties in F-I) ; Hopper v. Nicholas, 106 Ohio St. 292, 140 N. E.
186 (1922) (decedent's domicile); In re Hunter's Estate, 190 Okla. 284, 122 P. (2d)
1017 (1942) (decedent's domicile); see RESTATEMENTr, Con.xacr oF LAvs (1934)
§470(3).
35. See especially Boskey and Braucher, Jurisdiction and Collateral Alach2: Octobcr
Term, 1939 (1940) 40 CoL L. REv. 1006; (1939) 39 CoL L. REv. 274; (1939) 27 GE:O.
L. J. 1137; (1939) 23 MiNix. L. REv. 673; (1939) 17 Tr.:. L. REv. 485; (1939) 6 U.
OF C L L. REv. 293.
36. Boskey and Braucher, supra note 35, at 1013-14.
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fact." " The rationale of this whole series of cases was succinctly stated
in one of the decisions involving an inter partes contest in Idaho on an
issue of the jurisdiction of a Washington court under its own laws, in
which the Idaho court found the Washington judgment invalid. No effec-
tive appeal was taken from the Iotaho judgment. After it became final the
controversy came into the federal courts on interpleader under the federal
act; and in an opinion by Mr. Justice Reed sustaining the Idaho judgment
the Supreme Court said:
"Even where the decision against the validity of the original judg-
ment is erroneous, it is a valid exercise of judicial power by the
second court.
"One trial of an issue is enough. The principles of res judicata
apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues, as well
to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties," 88
The general effect of these decisions, through an expanding application
of the res judicata principle, is to curtail the application of the dogma that
37. As already pointed out, the statement that domicile is a jurisdictional fact in pro-
bate matters is, somewhat misleading, since it is universally conceded that presence of
property in a state is a factor warranting a local administration. Domicile is a jurisdic-
tional fact only in the rare case where there is no property in the state of administration,
Domicile, however, is important in determining the extraterritorial effect to be given to
a foreign probate judgment under the conflict of laws rule of the forum. It may also be
important in determining choice of law and other problems arising in an administration
proceeding, including whether probate in F-2 should be an original proceeding or made
pursuant to a statute permitting probate on authenticated copy of an F-1 proceeding, and
whether local assets should be transmitted to another state for distribution at the domi-
cile. Since the maxim inobilia sequuntur personam is in fact extensively applied for
various purposes in administration proceedings, the decedent's domicile is a matter of
paramount importance. But, with very few exceptions, it is not a jurisdictional fact in the
sense of determining the validity of a judgment in the state where rendered, Statutes
fixing local jurisdiction to grant letters of administration frequently provide for such
power in a court of the county or territorial district where decedent was domiciled at
the time of his death, without regard to the place of his death or the situs of his prop-
erty. It was formerly held in many states that a finding and adjudication that such
domicile existed was subject to collateral attack, but nearly all states now hold to the
contrary. 2 WOERNER, THE AIERICAN LAW OF AD.INIsTrTIoN (3d ed. 1923) 672,
During the last decade the decedent's domicile also became a jurisdictional fact, for the
limited purpose of determining state power to levy an inheritance tax upon intangible
assets. But under the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court on that vexed question
it is held that the Fourteenth Amendment no longer confines such taxing power to the
state of domicile, and that any state which has extended benefits or protection or which
can demonstrate "the practical fact of its power" or sovereignty as respects the asset may
likewise constitutionally make its exaction. State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich,
316 U. S. 174 (1942).
38. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U. S. 66, 78 (1939). Other important
cases in the series are: Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U. S.
371 (1940) ; Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938) ; Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938)
(full faith and credit clause). For detailed analysis, see Boskey and Braucher, supra
note 35.
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in an F-2 proceeding the jurisdiction of the F-i court is always open to
inquiry. It is no longer open to inquiry if the issue of jurisdiction over the
subject matter was contested inter partes in F-1. The rule had been there-
tofore established as to contested issues of jurisdiction over the person.39
That this recently ex-panded principle of res judicata will be enforced upon
the state courts under the full faith and credit clause is made reasonably
certain by two Supreme Court decisions.40 That it will include issues
necessarily passed upon, although not fully litigated in F-i, is indicated
by a third,' provided the same cause of action is involved in F-2 so that
the res judicata principle may be invoked in bar rather than as a collateral
estoppel.
As applied to the problem here under consideration, the above develop-
ments in Supreme Court doctrine point to the following results. Where, in
an F-1 probate proceeding, a finding is made as to decedent's domicile, that
finding must be respected in F-2 as to all persons who were parties to the
F-1 proceeding and properly before the court, even though domicile be
39. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U. S. 522 (1931) ; RE-
STATE T, CONFLICr OF LAws (1934) § 451 (a caveat to this section carefully refrains
from any opinion as to whether res judicata should preclude relitigation of an issue of
jurisdiction over the subject matter) : Boskey and Braucher, supra note 35. In (1939) 27
GEo. L. J. 1137, it is noted that the tightening effect of res judicata is not applied in cases
of extrinsic fraud in obtaining the F-1 judgment, nor in cases of gross denial of constitu-
tional rights.
40. Davis v. Davis, 305 U. S. 32 (1938); American Surety Company v. Baldwin,
287 U. S. 156 (1932). Neither case involved an F-2 state judgment directly reviewed in
the Supreme Court for denial of full faith and credit, but in each case a state judgment
was collaterally attacked in an independent proceeding in a federal court, and full faith
and credit was required to be given to the state adjudication of jurisdictional fact. As
the Court said in the American Surely case. id. at 166: "The full faith and credit
clause, together with the legislation pursuant thereto, applies to judicial proceedings of
a state court drawn in question in an independent proceeding in the federal courts."
41. Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 303 U. S. 371 (1940).
Pursuant to the Municipal Debt Readjustment Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 798, a federal dis-
trict court entered a final decree approving a plan of readjustment of the indebtedness of
the Chicot County Drainage District. The decree cancelled the defaulted bonds of the
District, and enjoined the bondholders from enforcing their claims except as provided
in the plan. No question of the validity of the statute was raised. Suon thereafter the
Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional in Ashton v. Camerun County Water
Improvement District, 298 U. S. 513 (1936). Subsequently, certain bondholders of the
Chicot County Drainage District who were parties in the readjustment proceeding, but
who had not appeared therein, brought action on their bonds in the Same federal court
which had decreed the readjustment. The district court and the circuit court of appeals
rejected the defense of res judicata on the ground that jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
depended upon an unconstitutional statute, and that the prior decree w.as void. The Su-
preme Court reversed, and held that the defense of res judicata may be pleaded as a bar
not only as respects matters actually presented to sustain or defeat the right asserted in
the prior proceeding, but also as respects any other available matter which might have
been presented to that end.
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considered a jurisdictional fact.42 As to such persons, all factual deter-
minations pertinent to such issues as substantial validity of a will must
be likewise conclusive in F-2. In either case, of course, it must be assumed
that such parties are concluded on the particular issue in F-i, for no greater
credit is required elsewhere of a judgment than it has where rendered.A
These conclusions could be vitiated, to be sure, if the Supreme Court
should accept the reasoning in the minority of state decisions discussed
above and hold that no F-1 judgment can have any effect upon property
contested in F-2, even though the parties were before the first court. Al-
though, as has been pointed out heretofore, the Supreme Court has
adopted the power theory in determining the effect of the full faith and
credit clause where the F-1 decree operates only in rem, it has not yet
applied that theory with its limiting consequences to the case of an F-1
decree operating in personam. It seems highly probable that such an ap-
plication will be made, for it would constitute a virtual denial that a pro-
bate judgment can operate as a judgment in personam as well as in rem;
and in two of its leading decisions on full faith and credit in the probate
field the Court clearly recognized that possibility. Both cases involved
conflicting adjudications of domicile. In the first, Baker v. Baker, Ecces
& Company,44 the intestate died owning shares in a Kentucky corpora-
tion and a claim against the corporation for profits. If this property
were distributed under Tennessee law, the widow would take it all; if
distributed under Kentucky law, one-half would go to intestate's mother.
The widow opened an administration in Tennessee, the ex parte order
42. See note 37 supra.
43. Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U. S. 608, 610 (1883) : "The act of Congress declar-
ing the effect to be given in any court within the United States to the records and judicial
proceedings of the several states, does not require that they shall have any greater force
and efficacy in other courts than in the courts of the States from which they are taken,
but only such faith and credit as by law or usage they have there." In considering the
effect of a judgment in the state where rendered it should not be overlooked that a pro-
bate decree may not always enjoy the same immunity to collateral attack as judgments
of other courts. The historical development in the status of probate courts in the United
States has been toward a similar conclusiveness, but in some states a divergence still
remains. See 1 WOERNER, THE AmERICAN LAW OF ADmINiSTRATION (3d ed. 1923) 488.
Another important distinction should not be overlooked. The principle of res judicata has
two aspects, one as a bar, the other as a collateral estoppel. A judgment is a bar against
the prosecution of a second action upon the same cause of action, and is conclusive not
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or
demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that
purpose. Where, however, the second suit between the same parties is upon a different
cause of action, the judgment in the prior suit operates as an estoppel only as to matters
actually litigated and determined, not as to what might have been litigated. Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U. S. 351 (1876) ; see Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgmnent (1942)
56 HARv. L. Rxv. 1. For that reason it is necessary to determine precisely what was liti-
gated by an F-1 judgment when it is brought into question in F-2.
44. 242 U. S. 394 (1917).
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reciting that intestate was a resident of that state. The widow then
sought to fortify her position by a chancery suit in Tennessee against
the mother and the corporation, in which defendants were cited by pub-
lication only and did not appear, and procured an adjudication that she
was owner and distributee of the shares and entitled to have new cer-
tificates issued to her. Mleanwhile, the mother had opened an administra-
tion in Kentucky and procured a decree finding that the intestate died a
resident of that state and that the property should be divided according to
Kentucky law. The widow then sued the corporation in Kentucky claim-
ing the entire property in reliance upon the Tennessee judgments; the
mother intervened and claimed her one-half interest under the Kentucky
judgment. Upon the denial of her claim the widow took the case to the
United States Supreme Court alleging a denial of full faith and credit to
her Tennessee judgments. In affirming the Kentucky judgment, the Su-
preme Court recognized the distinction between the effects of a judgment
in its operations in personam and in rem. As judgments in rem the Ten-
nessee findings were said to be conclusive only as to property in Tennessee,
and this property was legally situated in Kentucky. As judgments in
personam the Tennessee findings were invalid for want of due process of
law where defendants were not properly before the court. The Supreme
Court said that a single controlling decision upon the question of domicile
would be impossible "unless all possible distributees ... [could] be
brought within the jurisdiction of a single court having authority to pass
upon the subject-matter, either by service of process or by their voluntary
appearance," " despite the inconvenience of a failure to secure the ideal
distribution of the entire personal estate as a unit.
The second of these cases, Riley v. Neu, York Trust Co.," is the latest
pronouncement of the Supreme Court on constitutional control over
extraterritorial recognition of probate decrees, and it deserves careful
analysis, not only for that reason, but, as the Court said in explaining the
grant of certiorari, "because of the importance of issues previously un-
decided by this court. . . ." r The will of the testatrix was probated
in Georgia, as a domiciliary probate, with all persons entitled under Georgia
law to be heard, including her husband, actual parties by personal service.
A special finding of Georgia domicile was made over the husband's ob-
jection, and was approved, as an essential fact to determine jurisdiction,
by the highest court of Georgia in affirming the probate. Meanwhile an
independent administration was opened in New York, which state was also
asserted to be the domicile, and, at the suggestion of the testatrix' hus-
band and the state tax commission, the New York Trust Co. was ap-
45. Id. at 404-05.
46. 315 U. S. 343 (1942).
47. Id. at 348.
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pointed administrator c.t.a. Although the husband was before the New
York court, the heirs, beneficiaries of the will, and the Georgia executor
did not-appear and were served only by publication or by substituted ser-
vice in Georgia. At the time of her death the decedent owned certain
shares of stock in the Coca Cola International Corporation. The admin-
istrator and the executor, each claiming to be the domiciliary representa-
tive, asserted the right to have new certificates representing the shares
issued to him. The corporation was fortunate enough to get both repre-
sentatives before a Delaware court of chancery on a bill of interpleader,
where they agreed that Delaware was the situs of the stock. The Delaware
court made an independent determination of domicile, and on the record
it was held in the Delaware Supreme Court that the testatrix was domi-
ciled in New York and that the corporation should issue new certificates
to the New York administrator. The question on certiorari was whether
Delaware had denied full faith and credit to the Georgia judgment. The
Court held it had not. In the opinion, delivered by Mr. Justice Reed, we
have the clearest expression by the Court to date of the difference in im-
pact of the doctrine of res judicata depending upon whether the probate
decree in question operates strictly in rem or whether it may be permitted
to operate in personam. He said:
"While the Georgia judgment is to have the same faith and credit
in Delaware as it does in Georgia, that requirement does not give
the Georgia judgment extraterritorial effect upon assets in other
states. So far as the assets in Georgia are concerned the Georgia
judgment of probate is in ren; so far as it affects personalty beyond
the state, it is in personam and can bind only the parties thereto or
their privies." 48
Insofar as this case merely holds that a probate decree in rem is not
entitled to full faith and credit in another state, as applied to property
there, it follows a long line of predecessors in the same Court. As a judg-
ment in rem, operating solely upon Georgia property, its effect, including
the determination of Georgia domicile, could not be disputed either in
Georgia or another state. But because the New York administrator would
have no standing in Georgia to contest the will or the determination of
domicile, it does not follow that he could not raise those questions in an-
other state as they relate to property there which was not subject to the
Georgia jurisdiction in rem. The clear inference from this opinion is that
he would be so precluded only if he were before the Georgia court, or so
represented there, as to be bound by the Georgia judgment in personam
as well as in rem. Was the New York administrator, who was not a party
in Georgia, so represented as to be bound in personam? Does the answer
to this question depend upon Georgia doctrines of res judicata and the
48. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U. S. 343, 353 (1942).
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Georgia conception of the representative or class suit? If, under Georgia
law, the administrator is bound in personam, does the full faith and credit
clause require a like result in other states? Or, if Georgia professes to
bind the adninistrator in personam by representation of the husband, does
she violate due process of law? These were the important issues "pre-
viously undecided by this Court."
On one point all members of the Court were agreed. Since the New
York administrator was charged with the duty of paying inheritance taxes
upon the estate, his interest was adverse to that of the husband and next
of kin, who were before the Georgia court; and if the effect of the probate
decree in Georgia in personam was to bind lim by representation of those
so in adverse interest, it would be a denial of procedural due process. In
his concurring opinion Chief Justice Stone relied upon that ground alone
and found it unnecessary to consider the other questions discussed by
Mr. Justice Reed. Mr. Justice Frankfurter and Mr. Justice Jackson con-
curred with the Chief justice. In the main opinion, however, Afr. Justice
Reed considered the Georgia law on representation as disclosed in the
record and concluded that thereunder the Georgia judgment could bind
the New York administrator only in rem. This conclusion relegates to
the status of a dictum the further very interesting observation that "By
the Constitutional provision for full faith and credit, the local doctrines
of res judicata, speaking generally, become a part of national jurispru-
dence, and therefore federal questions cognizable here." " If this dictum
can be relied upon, it would seem that, within the limits of procedural due
process, state doctrines or res judicata in personam may be enforced in
other states under the full faith and credit clause. In other words, where
under its own local law an F-1 probate judgment operates both in per-
sonam and in rem and binds in personam the parties, their privies, and
others participating in the litigation or represented therein, the judgment
may be entitled to constitutional full faith and credit in F-2 as a judg-
ment in personam as to persons so bound in F-1. If, however, the F-1
judgment professes to bind in personam by representation a person who
was not a formal party to the suit, the state doctrine of representation
must comply with the Supreme Court test of procedural due process, or
the judgment will be invalid in F-1 as well as in F-2 as to one so repre-
sented. The Supreme Court test of due process for state doctrines of
representation in class suits was announced in 1940 in Hasbcrry v. Lee."
49. Id. at 349.
50. 311 U. S. 32 (1940). The author does not contend that all judgments in per-
sonam which are valid under the test of due process are entitled to full faith and credit
elsewhere under present decisions of the Court. The speculation to that effect is merely
an attempt to project the trend of recent decisions. In the past the Court has held that a
judgment may be res judicata in personam in the state where rendered and yet nut be
entitled to full faith and credit in another state. In Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper
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The Court required that members of the class who participate in the liti-
gation adequately represent the absent party in such a way as to insure
protection of his interests. If their interests are adverse to his, the judg-
ment is not res judicata as to him.
The only question necessarily determined by the Supreme Court in the
Riley case was that Delaware had not denied full faith and credit to the
Georgia judgment when Delaware made a determination of New York
domicile and turned local property over to the New York representative.
If, however, the analysis is correct as to the difference in impact of the
principles of res judicata in personam and in rem, there are further inter-
esting implications with respect to the effect of the full faith and credit
clause upon two different controversies which lay behind the whole litiga-
tion. The first was whether the husband was entitled to an indefeasible
share in the wife's property, which was assured him under New York law,
but not under Georgia law. The second was which state, New York or
Georgia, was entitled under its own laws to levy an inheritance tax. Both
controversies would depend upon the domicile at death. As to the hus-
band's rights, it would seem that the Georgia decision was conclusive as to
property everywhere, since he and the other claimants to the estate were
before the Georgia court in personam. As to the right to tax, however,
the New York representative and the State of New York, not having been
parties to the Georgia proceeding, would be bound by the Georgia deter-
mination of domicile only as to property in Georgia. The result is that
the decedent was domiciled in different places for different purposes: in
Georgia, for the purpose of determining the husband's rights in her estate
wherever situated; in New York, for the purpose of determining the right
to tax the property before the Delaware court.
Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U. S. 111 (1912), the Court held that F-2 might inquire
whether, under F-2 law or "general law," F-i had jurisdiction over the person of one not
a formal party in F-I, even though under F-1 lav the judgment was res judicata as to
him. That holding long preceded the decisions, discussed above, in which the Court ex-
panded its application of the res judicata principle and curtailed the dogma that in F-2
the jurisdiction of F-1 is always open to inquiry. Another recent illustration of the nar-
rowing zone of freedom of state action between the due process and the full faith and
credit clauses may be found in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287 (1942), hold-
ing that a default divorce decree obtained in the state of plaintiff's residence on service
by publication is entitled to full faith and credit in another state. In addition to attacks
on the ground of lack of F-1 jurisdiction, there were in the past a number of other judi-
cially sanctioned reasons for refusing to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment which
was valid in the state where rendered. It was held, for example, that F-2 might refuse
recognition where the F-1 judgment was against the public policy of F-2 or where it
involved enforcement of F-1 penal or fiscal laws. Even here the Supreme Court is tend-
ing to say that these defenses are no longer available. Milwaukee County v. White Co.,
296 U. S. 268 (1935) (penal and fiscal laws) ; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230 (1908)
(public policy).
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A recent decision in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals "' recognizes
also the distinction between the effects of a probate decree operating both
in rem and in personam. Although no reliance was placed upon the full
faith and credit clause, the court did apply the recently enlarged Supreme
Court conception of res judicata in a probate case involving disputed
domicile. The testator left two wills entirely irreconcilable in terms. The
earlier will was probated in Massachusetts in a proceeding which pur-
ported to be domiciliary and in which Florida claimants were cited only
by publication. The later will was probated in Florida, and it was found
that testator was domiciled in that state. The beneficiary of the Massa-
chusetts will appeared in the Florida case and sought revocation of pro-
bate on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence in
obtaining the second will, and claimed the estate under terms of the earlier
will. Before this contest was disposed of, the Florida representative
brought action in the federal court in Florida to collect insurance assets
of the estate. The insurer procured an interpleader of the Massachusetts
claimant and was discharged upon paying the money into court. The in-
terpleader proceeding was then stayed, pending the disposition of the con-
test in the Florida probate court. When the second will was there upheld,
the federal court ordered the money paid to the Florida representative. In
affirming this decision, the Circuit Court of Appeals relied upon the res
judicata principles recently established in the Supreme Court and re-
marked that "As against the parties actually contesting it, a court may
conclusively adjudicate its own jurisdiction." r2 The relevancy of this
remark rests on the assumption that domicile was a jurisdictional fact
which each state could properly determine for itself, and that, except for
the res judicata effect in personan of the Florida judgment, the federal
court could have made an independent determination of domicile in order
to determine which was the true domiciliary representative to whom the
insurance was payable.
DISCRETION AS TO RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN DECREES
Returning to cases uncomplicated by an in personam application of the
res judicata principle, the question arises as to existing criteria for deter-
mining the extraterritorial recognition of probate decrees of the type re-
ferred to herein as ex parte. Certain New York decisions have asserted
that such recognition is in the discretion of the New York surrogate.0
51. Roberts v. Bathurst, 112 F. (2d) 543 (C. C. A. 5th, 1940).
52. Id. at 545.
53. See In re Cornell's Will, 267 N. Y. 456, 196 N. E. 396, 101 A. L R. 1502, 1510
(1935), holding that the surrogate in his discretion could decline tu try the issue of domi-
cile between two foreign representatives each claiming to have been appointed at the dtmi-
cile of decedent, but could turn over New York assets to one of them for litigation else-
where. See also In re Beban's Estate, 135 Aisc. 25, 237 N. Y. Supp. 701 (Surr. Ct. 1929) ;
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There are undoubtedly many judicial controversies in which the interests
of justice are best served by leaving the solution to the sound judgment
of a judge rather than by prescribing a fixed rule, but the writer believes
that the recognition of foreign probate decrees is not such a problem. The
lawyer handling an estate situated in several states is confronted, at best,
with a number of uncertainties which interfere with the ideal of unitary
administration and add to the expense of his total task. In the typical
case he probates a will or opens an administration proceeding at the last
domicile of the decedent, and rightfully assumes, on the basis of pre-
cedent, that for many purposes the courts in other states will look upon
that as the primary administration. Having established the fact of testacy
or of intestacy in that state, the handling of property elsewhere will be
greatly facilitated through definite rules in the other states as to the effect
of the domiciliary decree, particularly if such rules favor recognition on
issues of essential validity. If the desirable end of a single effectual pro-
bate is to be achieved, it seems clear on the basis of both precedent and
policy that it must come through a more general recognition of the con-
clusiveness of a domiciliary probate. Yet if such recognition is left to the
discretion of each probate judge, there is little probability that general
recognition will be achieved, for the judge will be reluctant to preclude a
contest insisted upon by local claimants who have not seen fit to journey to
the state of decedent's domicile to litigate their claims in the first instance.
Furthermore, the domiciliary representative or those claiming tinder the
domiciliary decree may spend much time and money attempting to induce
judges in other states to accept the domiciliary adjudication as conclusive.
A good illustration of the latter possibility is to be found in litigation
concerning the estate of Elizabeth Eaton. 54 It may not be more than a
coincidence that this litigation took place in New York, where recognition
of foreign domiciliary decrees is sometimes said to be discretionary. The
testatrix died in 1906, domiciled in Michigan, leaving most of her estate
in the form of securities in custody of a relative in New York. A will was
admitted to probate in Michigan, but a proffered codicil was rejected on
the ground of want of testamentary capacity. Both will and codicil were
probated in New York. Thereafter, during the next quarter of a century
the Michigan representative and the claimant under the Michigan decree
In re Harriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 208 N. Y. Supp. 672 (Surr. Ct. 1924), aff'd without
opinion, 216 N. Y. Supp. 842 (App. Div., 1st Dep't 1926). Cf. In re Marsland's Estate,
142 Misc. 230, 254 N. Y. Supp. 293 (Surr. Ct. 1931), in which it was said that the ad-
mission to probate by a Swiss court of the will of a Swiss domiciliary "conclusively dem-
onstrates" the validity of the document according to Swiss law, and that under the
Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Executed, adopted by New York Laws 1919, c. 294, such a
will, if in writing and subscribed by the testator, is valid for all purposes in New York.
54. For a summary of this extended litigation, see Watkins v. Madison County Trust
& Deposit Co., 40 F. (2d) 91 (N. D. N. Y. 1930); an earlier case in the proceedings,
Higgins v. Eaton, 202 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913).
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endeavored unsuccessfully through eight distinct proceedings in the New
York state and federal courts to procure recognition of the domiciliary
decree and distribution of the New York property in accordance with it.
In states other than New York, the matter of recognition is usually
handled by fixed conflict of laws rules, rather than by the discretion of
the probate judge. But such rules are not uniform and in some states are
much in need of clarification; and different rules frequently exist in the
same state depending upon whether the property in F-2 is real or personal.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
The formulation of existing rules concerning recognition of foreign
probate decrees is complicated by the fact that most states have some type
of legislation relating to the probate of foreign wills. This legislation
varies in terms from state to state, and it is frequently difficult, moreover,
to determine the extent to which a particular case turns upon such legis-
lation. By putting aside for later consideration the relevant statutes and
cases in which they seem to have been of considerable importance, we ar-
rive at what may be termed common law rules on the extraterritorial
recognition of probate decrees. In deriving those rules from the cases,
it becomes necessary to distinguish between personal property and real
property subject to F-2 jurisdiction.
As to personal property subject to F-2, the majority rule is reflected
in the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, which provides that:
"A judgment in administration proceedings by a competent court
in the state of domicil will be followed by the courts in other states
in so far as the judgment relates to movables." n5
The Restatement contains no analogous rule covering real property, but
a comment upon the above section explains that the action of a court in
a state other than the situs concerning succession to land has no extra-
territorial effect.56
55. RESTATE.AENT. CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) § 470(1). In a comment on this sub-
section the rationale is stated as follows: "The statement in this Subsection is based upn
the principle that, unless provided otherwise by statute, the devolution of movables in
both testate and intestate succession is determined by the law of the state of domicil
of the decedent at the time of death. . . . An adjudication by a court at the domicil,
therefore, with regard to a particular person's estate, will be conclusively received in other
states as the application of the domiciliary law as applied to that estate. This rule is
applicable although the persons participating in the litigation and the property being ad-
ministered are different from those involved in the proceedings in the domiciliary state."
The precise terms "movables" and "immovables" rather than "realty" and "personalty"
are used in the Restatement and frequently in critical writings on conflicts of laws, but
the courts usually use the terms "personal property" and "real property," and the usage
of the courts is followed here.
56. RE TATnmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS (1934) §470(l), comment c. The reason
assigned is that "Succession to land is governed by the la,, of the state where the land
1944]
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The decisions supporting the above formulation as to personal property
are somewhat unsatisfactory in that many of them, as has been heretofore
pointed out, place a spurious reliance upon the full faith and credit clause
of the Federal Constitution. Some of the best opinions upon the subject,
when examined, prove to be dicta rather than holdings. Furthermore, the
opinions frequently assume that recognition of the domiciliary decree
follows automatically from the common law choice of law rule under
which the succession to personal property, testate or intestate, is governed
by the law of the domicile.5" This practice of making interdependent the
problems of choice of law and recognition of foreign judgments, reflected
also in the Restatement,5" should not be too lightly dismissed. It has re-
sulted in much confusion in thought. The two problems, although related
to a limited extent, present important differences in policy. The maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam as a choice of law rule involves no more than
the recognition that it seems fair to distribute a decedent's property, testate
or intestate, according to the substantive rules prevailing at his domicile
without regard to the location of the property or the court in which dis-
tribution is made. It may be supposed that he was familiar with those
rules, or that he and his legal adviser had them in mind in considering the
is." Thus, as to both real and personal property, the effect of foeeign probate judgments
is made dependent in the Restatement upon the common law choice of law rules. See
note 55 supra.
57. See Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410 (1879); Brock's Adm'r v. Frank, 51 Ala.
85 (1874). But see Marx v. Loeb, 228 Ala. 196, 153 So. 266 (1934) (foreign probated
will and rights thereunder cannot be recognized until probated locally) ; Knight v. Whee-
don, 104 Ga. 309, 30 S. E. 794 (1898) ; Duckwall v. Lease, 20 N. E. (2d) 204 (Ind. App.
Ct. 1939) ; Kurtz v. Kurtz's Estate, 169 Md. 554, 182 AtI. 456 (1936) (full faith and credit
clause relied upon) ; Morrison v. Hass, 229 Mass. 514, 118 N. E. 893 (1918) (follows
the theory of Crippen v. Dexter, pages 229-31 supra) ; In re Coppock's Estate, 72 Mont. 431,
234 Pac. 258 (1925) [follows State ex rel. Ruef v. District Court, 34 Mont. 96, 85 Pac. 866
(1906)]; Nelson v. Potter, 50 N. J. L. 324, 15 AtI. 375 (1888); McEwan v. Brown, 176
N. C. 249, 97 S. E. 20 (1918) (both real and personal property in F-2 and domiciliary
probated will held subject to challenge for undue influence and lack of testamentary ca-
pacity as to real property, but conclusive as to personal property) ; Grignon v. Shope, 100
Ore. 611, 197 Pac. 317 (1921) (full faith and credit) ; Cornell v. Burr, 32 S, D. 1, 141 N.
W. 1081' (1913); Hodge v. Taylor, 87 S. W. (2d) 533 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) [follows
Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. (2d) 726 (1931), in reliance upon full faith
and credit clause]. Compare Martin v. Stovall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S. IV. 296, 48 L. R. A.
130 (1899), with Woodfin v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 174 Tern. 367, 125
S. IV. (2d) 487 (1939). Where the foreign decree has been non-domiciliary, it has usually
been denied recognition. See i re Clark's Estate, 148 Cal. 108, 82 Pac. 760 (1905) ; In re
Griggs' Estate, 135 Minn. 353, 160 N. W. 1018 (1917) ; in re Cameron's Estate, 47 App.
Div. 120, 62 N. Y. Supp. 187 (3d Dep't 1900), aff'd without opinion, 166 N. Y. 610, 59
N. E. 1120 (1901) ; In re Gaines' Will, 84 Hun 520, 32 N. Y. Supp. 398 (Sup. Ct. 1895),
aff'd, 154 N. Y. 747, 49 N. E. 1097 (1897) ; De Tray v. Hardgrove, 52 S. W. (2d) 239
(Tex. Comm. App. 1932) ; Vogel v. New York Life Ins. Co., 55 F. (2d) 205 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932).
58. See notes 55 and 56 supra.
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disposition of his property. When, however, the maxim is to be extended
in application so that an ex parte adjudication by the court of the domicile
will be conclusively received elsewhere as an application of the domiciliary
law, it must be on the assumption that it is fair to require all beneficiaries
who claim an interest in the estate, wherever they may be, to appear at the
domicile for purposes of litigation. It is suggested that such an assump-
tion should be made, not alone by implication from the choice of law rule,
but because it offers the only practical possibility of procuring a unified
administration and avoiding the confusion, expense, and delay incident to
conflicting adjudications in the various states where property is situated.
The doctrinal difficulties involved in carrying out this assumption are indi-
cated by a minority group of decisions which adhere to the power theory
even as to personal property. 9 The rationale of those decisions is that,
since a probate proceeding is an exercise of jurisdiction in rem, the F-1
judgment is effective only as to property within the state. This technical
obstruction to a unified administration, however, may be obviated, as has
been suggested above,"9 by treating the subject matter of the proceeding
as the status of testacy or intestacy rather than as the property situated in
the state. Extraterritorial recognition of the F-1 decree is then achieved
by application of the F-2 conflict of laws rule that the decedent's last
domicile is the appropriate forum for a final determination of that status.
In contrast to the extraterritorial recognition usually given to a domi-
ciliary decree where personal property in F-2 is concerned, the great weight
of authority denies such recognition as to real property." The inconveni-
59. Higgins -. Eaton, 202 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ; New York Trust Co. v. Riley,
16 A. (2d) 772 (Del. 1940) ; In re Gifford's Will, 279 N. Y. 470, IS N. E. (2d) G63 (1939) ;
Olney v. Angell, 5 R. I. 198 (1858); Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 112 (1858). Where the
property in controversy in F-2 was within the territorial limits of F-i when the F-I judg-
ment was entered, the F-1 judgment will be respected even though F-2 is the domicile.
See State v. Wright, 194 Ark. 652, 109 S. W. (2d) 123 (1937); Newcomb v. Newcomb,
log Ky. 582, 57 S. W. (2d) (1900) ; Walton v. Hall's Estate, 66 Vt. 455, 29 Ati. 803
(1894).
60. See note 9 supra.
61. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900); Foster v. Kragh, 107 Colo. 389, 113 p.
(2d) 666 (1941) ; Ferriday v. Grosvenor, 86 Conn. 698, 86 Ati. 569 (1913) ; Pritchard v.
Henderson, 2 Penn. 553, 47 At. 376 (Del. 1900); Trotter v. Van Pelt, 144 Fla. 517,
198 So. 215, 131 A. L. R. 1018, 1023 (1940) ; Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218, 60 S. E.
529 (1908) ; McNamara v. McNamara, 293 Ill. 54, 127 N. E. 130 (1920) (construction
of will) ; Dibble v. Winter, 247 Ill. 243, 93 N. E. 145 (1910); Evansville Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E. 592 (1897) ; Foster v. Jordan, 130 Ky.
445, 113 S. V. 490 (1908) ; Sneed v. Ewing, S J. J. Mar. 460 (Ky. 1831) ; XWodville v.
Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127 (1919); Keith v. Johnson, 97 Mo. 223, 10 S. AV. 597
(1889); Allaire v. Allaire, 37 N. J. L. 312 (1875), aff'd, 39 N. J. L. 113 (1876); Lowe
v. Plainfield Trust Co., 216 App. Div. 72, 215 N. Y. Supp. 50 (1st Dep't 1920) ; McEwan
v. Brown, 176 N. C. 249, 97 S. E. 20 (1918) ; Bowen v. Johnson, 5 R. I. 112 (18S);
Cornell v. Burr, 32 S. D. 1, 141 N. W. 1081 (1913) ; Kirkland Y. Calhoun, 147 Tenn. 3M3,
248 S. V. 302 (1923). Contra, Brocek's Adm'r v. Frank, 51 Ala. S5 (1874); Crippen v.
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ence of multiple litigation incident to this distinction between real and
personal property may be illustrated by a North Carolina case.0 2 The
testator died domiciled in Virginia leaving all of his property by will to his
cousin, the defendant, who was also named executor. The will was pro-
bated in Virginia and then filed in North Carolina, where the testator
owned both real and personal property. The heirs at law divided the
North Carolina property and then sued the defendant as executor and
devisee claiming that the will was invalid for lack of testamentary capac-
ity, that it was procured by undue influence, that it was deficient in form
under North Carolina law, and that it constituted a cloud on the plaintiff's
title. It was held that a contest was open upon all those grounds as to
the real estate, but that a demurrer should be sustained as to personal
property, in regard to which plaintiffs if so advised, should proceed by
caveat in Virginia.
It seems clear that if the convenience of a unified administration is to
be attained through wider extraterritorial recognition of domiciliary pro-
bate decrees, such recognition must be extended as to both real and per-
sonal property. How convincing are the reasons given by the cases which
deny recognition as to land?
Many of the decisions rely upon the common law choice of law rule
under which the validity of a devise depends upon the law of the situs of
the land. That rule, as will more fully appear hereafter, has proven to be
too restrictive and has been modified in many states by legislation estab-
lishing alternative reference points for choice of law, so that wills of both
real and personal property are valid if executed in the manner prescribed
-by the law of the place where executed, or of the testator's domicile, or in
accordance with local law. Where such legislation has been adopted, the
most common reason given for the distinction between real and personal
property no longer exists. In either case a foreign domiciliary decree ad-
mitting a will to probate may be regarded by the court of the situs as an
authoritative finding that the domiciliary standards of validity have been
complied with, and those standards are made applicable to local property
under the local conflict of laws statutory rules. But, as has been hereto-
fore pointed out, there is no essential connection or complete correlation
between choice of law rules and the determination of effect of foreign
judgments. The above statutes refer primarily to standards of formal
validity; and where they have not been adopted, there can be no doubt that
a foreign will, although probated at the domicile, must comply with the
local Wills Act in order to be effective as to local real estate. But while
the question of formal validity may be open under the local Wills Act,
Dexter, 79 Mass. 330 (1859) ; State ex rel. Ruef v. District Court, 34 Mont. 96, 85 Pac.
866 (1906) ; Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. (2d) 726 (1931).
62. McEwan v. Brown, 176 N. C. 249, 97 S. E. 20 (1918).
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because in no way an issue in the litigation at the domicile, it does not
necessarily follow that contest should be allowed on matters of essential
validity, such as testamentary capacity and undue influence, where the will
has been admitted at the domicile. In other words, quite apart from the
questions as to standards of formal validity, it would seem desirable in
the interests of unified administration to adopt a conflict of laws rule rec-
ognizing that the court of domicile is primarily the appropriate forum in
which to raise questions of essential validity of a will; and if the will has
been there adjudged either valid or invalid, the decree should be recognized
as conclusive on those grounds elsewhere both as to real and per-
sonal property. If the conflict of laws rule of the situs provides for
validity of a will executed in accordance with the standards of formal
validity prevailing at the domicile, then a foreign domiciliary decree ad-
mitting the will should be equally conclusive as to form.
Decisions denying recognition as to land are almost unanimous in ad-
herence to the power theory argument that land is subject exclusively to
the jurisdiction of the courts of the situs and that recognition of a foreign
decree would constitute an abandonment of that jurisdiction. Recognition
of the foreign decree, however, does not involve a surrender of juris-
diction or power over local land. It merely means that in the exercise of
that power the court of the situs adopts a conflict of laws rule which it
believes takes adequately into account the foreign element in the case,
namely, the fact that the will has been either rejected or established at the
domicile, and declares that under those circumstances the law of the forum
precludes a local contest on essential validity of the will. The court of the
situs merely decides to act in a truly ancillary manner in furtherance of
the primary administration. The foreign decree does not adjudicate the
title to local land. Only the court of the situs can do that, but in doing so
it may prescribe its own conditions for the recognition of the foreign
decree. Or, as Professor Nussbaum says, it tests "in the forum's own
terms, a requirement for granting territorial expansion to the res judicata
effect of the foreign judgment." ' The foreign judgment receives its
extraterritorial recommendation as res judicata because the doctrine is
applied under the common law or statutory conflict of laws rule in F-2, al-
though not yet, perhaps, required by the full faith and credit clause of
the Constitution.
Closely associated with the argument in terms of jurisdiction is the
policy argument that land titles should not be subjected to the uncertainty
incident to recognition of a foreign judgment. This objection disappears,
however, once it is understood that the forum may establish its own con-
ditions for recognition. -ost states make statutory provision for the
recording of foreign probate decrees, or for ancillary probate of foreign
63. See Nussbaum, supra note 5, at 225.
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wills affecting local property, and compliance with such provisions as a
condition to recognition would adequately safeguard the objectives of the
land recording system. Even Massachusetts, long an exponent of the rule
of recognition, has required local ancillary probate of a foreign will ad-
mitted at the domicile, as a condition precedent to recognition of rights
in local land under such will. 4 With the provision of such safeguards,
there would seem to be little reason to require the continuance of the dis-
tinction between real and personal property. If it is fair, in the interests
of a unified administration, to require all prospective contestants of a will
to appear and make their attack at the testator's domicile, where personal
property is situated outside the domiciliary state, it seems equally reason-
able to impose such a burden upon the claimants under a will of land.
EFFECT OF LEGISLATION
Legislation in some states has played an appreciable part in determin-
ing the effect given judicially to foreign probate decrees. Frequently, how-
ever, the statutes are not clear and precise on the point, and the conclusive-
ness of the foreign decree depends upon the cumulative effect of a number
of statutory provisions each bearing only indirectly upon the problem.
The pattern of relevant legislation differs from state to state, and broad
generalizations are hazardous. Furthermore, statutory provisions reason-
ably clear in their import are sometimes construed in subordination to
broad principles of jurisdiction or full faith and credit along lines here-
tofore discussed. Complete analysis of the law of each state cannot be
undertaken here. Only such generalizations will be attempted as seem rele-
vant to an evaluation of existing statutes in terms of their effectiveness
in contributing to a unified administration centered at the decedent's last
domicile.
The relationship between the problems of choice of law and effect of
foreign judgments has already been indicated at some length. That re-
lationship requires that attention be given to legislation which, in the con-
flict of laws sense, fixes the standards of validity for a will. In a few states
the statutes are in confirmation of the common law rules under which
validity of wills of realty is determined by the law of the situs and wills of
personalty by the law of the testator's domicile at the time of his death.0 1
64. Solis v. Williams, 205 Mass. 350, 91 N. E. 148 (1910) ; accord, Marx v. Loeb,
228 Ala. 196, 1'53 So. 266 (1934) ; Sayre v. Sage, 47 Colo. 559, 108 Pac. 160 (1910) ; Fer-
riday v. Grosvenor, 86 Conn. 698, 86 Atl. 569 (1913) ; Chidsey v. Brookes, 130 Ga. 218,
60 S. E. 529 (1908) ; Howard v. Merker, 73 Ind. App. 400, 127 N. E. 807 (1920) ; Smith
v. Reneau, 188 Okla. 629, 112 P. (2d) 160 (1941); Olney v. Angell, 5 R. I. 198 (1858);
Walton v. Hall's Estate, 66 Vt. 455, 29 Atl. 803 (1894).
65. CAL. PROD. CODE (Deering, 1941) § 26; DE. REv. CODE (1935) §3714 (will of
nonresident probated elsewhere, valid as to personal property, although not in compliance
with Delaware law); FLA. STATS. ANN. (1941) § 731.07(3) ; GA. CODE (1938) §§ 102.108,
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Most of these statutes expressly provide for, or do not exclude, the validity
of wills of personalty if executed in accordance with the local Wills Act
even though not in accordance with the law of the domicile, thus provid-
ing alternative reference points as to personal property of a non-resident
decedent.
In more than half the states, statutes have been enacted which modify
the common law rules by providing alternative reference points for stand-
ards of formal validity of wills. These statutes are general in terms and
make no distinction between real and personal property. They differ con-
cerning the permissible reference points chosen. The largest group pro-
vides that a foreign executed will shall be deemed legally effective if exe-
cuted in accordance with the local law of the adopting state or in the mode
prescribed by the law either of the place where executed or of the testator's
domicile.66 It should be observed that the reference to the law of testator's
domicile is indefinite as to the time of reference, in failing to specify
either the time of execution or of death. Most of these statutes were
adoptions of the old Uniform Vills Act, Foreign Executed, declared ob-
solete by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
113.705; Ky. Rrv. STAT. A-,x. (Baldwin, 1943) §§ 394.120, 394.150: Mo. REv. STAT. A-.
(1939) §§253, 550; X. J. STAT. AN. (1939) tit. 2, c. 31, §27, tit. 3, c. 2, §937-45: N. C.
CODE A.NN. (MNichie & Sublett, 1939) §4152; PA. ST.T. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 20, §231;
VA CODE AxN. (Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1942) §§ 5231, 5251; AV. V,%. CoD- A.-:.
(Michie, Sublett & Stedman, 1943) §§ 4043, 4073.
66. ALAsicA ComP. LAws (1933) § 4625 (provided foreign will is in writing and
subscribed by testator) ; IOWA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) § 11893 (provided foreign will
is in writing and subscribed by testator); KN. GE;. STAT. A:zzz. (Corrick, Supp. 1941)
§ 59.609 (provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by testator; prior to 1929
this section contained the wording of the Uniform Wills Act, Fureign Executed, but in
that year it was amended to make more definite the time of reference to law of testat,,r's
residence, i.e., "either at the time of its execution or of the testator's death") : LA. GN.
STAT. Ax-,. (Dart, 1939) § 9723 (provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed to
by testator); MD. AN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 93, §350 (provided foreign will is in
writing and subscribed by testator); MAss. A.NN. LAws (Michie, 1932) c. 191, § 5 (pro-
vided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by testator); Mici. ST.T. ANN. (Moire.
1943) § 27.3178(97) (provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by testator) -
MINN. STATS. (.Mason, 1927) §8738 (if not executed according to Minnes.,ta law,
will must be in writing, signed by the testator, and valid according to the laws of the
state or country in which it was made or of the testator's domicile) ; NED. Comp. STAT.
(Kyle, Supp. 1941) § 30.205 (provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by tes-
tator); Nay. Co'p. LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9929 (provided foreign will is in writing
and subscribed by testator) ; N. Y. DECDENT ESTATE LAwi, § 22a (provided foreign will
is in writing and subscribed by testator); R. I. Gr-.,. LAws A..-,. (1938) c. 565, §35
(provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by testator) ; VT. Ptn. LAws (1933)
§ 2767 (provided foreign will is in writing and subscribed by testator); WAsU. Rv.
STAT. A-NNx. (Remington, 1932) § 1395; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 238.07 (provided foreign
will is in writing and subscribed by testator, and provided further, this section shall nut
affect such nuncupative wills as are mentioned in the chapter).
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1940, and superseded by section 7 of the Model Execution of Wills Act
promulgated at that time. 7 In several other states the permissible reference
points are the local law, the law of the place of execution, or the law of
testator's domicile at the time of execution."" Other statutes provide but
two reference points, the local law and the law of the place of execution.60
In a few states the only relevant statutes found were those providing for
ancillary probate or recording of wills, admitted to probate elsewhere, on
authenticated copies of the foreign probate. In three of those states admit-
tance to record or ancillary probate is authorized if, on hearing, it appears
the will was executed according to the local law or the law of the place
of execution or the law of the place where the testator was at the time
domiciled. 70 The Ohio statute provides that authenticated copies of wills
executed and proved according to the laws of any other state may be ad-
mitted and shall have the same validity as wills duly made in Ohio.71  The
South Carolina statute authorizes admission, on authenticated record, of
wills admitted in any other state, regardless of any provisions of law of
South Carolina relating to the witnessing and attestation of wills.
1 "
Several observations may be made concerning the relationship between
these choice of law statutes and the question of recognition of foreign
probate decrees with which we are directly concerned. It will be recalled
that existence of legislation of this kind has been one of the factors
which in a few cases led the courts to a broader outlook toward recog-
67. 9 U. L. A. (1942) 277. Section 7 of the Model Act is substantially like the Uni-
form Wills Act, Foreign Executed, but it is definite as to time of reference to the law of
testator's domicile by providing for that law at the time of execution. Section 8 of the
Model Act provides that the Act shall not apply io wills offered for ancillary probate in
this state which have been admitted to probate in the state or country of the testator's
domicile. The probable explanation for this exclusion is the existence of a Uniform Wills
Act, Foreign Probated. The Model Execution of Wills Act was adopted, Tenn. Pub.
Acts 1941, c. 125.
68. Imu REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed., 1943) c. 3, § 237 (provided foreign will is writ-
ten and signed by testator); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935)
§6988; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5653; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1941) tit. 84, §§71,
72; S. D. CODE (1939) § 56.0212 (provided will is in writing and subscribed by testator) ;
Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 125, § 7 [provided foreign will is in writing; this is an adoption
of the Model Execution of Wills Act, 9 U. L. A. 277 (1942) ] ; UTAu CODE ANN. (1943)
§ 101.1.14.
69. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) § 14557; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 4876;
ME. RFv. STAT. (1930) c. 76, § 13; N. H. RFv. LAWS (1942) c. 350, § 5; N. M. STAT.
ANN. (1941) § 32.110; ORE. Cozxp. LAWS ANN. (1940) § 18.701 (alternative reference,
law of place of execution only as to personal property; will of real property must com-
ply with Oregon law).
70. Aaiz. CODE ANN. (1939) § 38.215; IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) § 15.222; Wyo.
REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) § 88.303.
71. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) § 10511.5.
72. S. C. CODE (1942) § 8948.
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nition 3 Where these statutes adopt as one of the alternative reference
points the law of the testator's domicile, one of the most common reasons
found in the cases for the distinction between real and personal property
ceases to have validity. The preservation of that distinction in the Re-
statement, as was pointed out above, was rationalized in the commentary,
upon the basis of the common law choice of law rules. 4 It would seem
that if a foreign domiciliary decree is to be received as conclusive in ap-
plication to personal property because it indicates that the domiciliary
standards of execution have been met, it should be equally conclusive as
to land where, under statutes, the domiciliary standards have been adopted
as an alternative reference point for both kinds of property.
It seems obvious that most of these statutes were drafted without tak-
ing into consideration the one legitimate connection between choice of law
and the problem of recognition of foreign probate decrees. As has been
indicated heretofore, that one legitimate connection is found in the fact
that if the foreign domiciliary decree is to be taken as conclusive on formal
validity of the will, the standards for formal validity at the domicile and
the situs should be the same. If they are not the same, the judgment at
the domicile would in no way touch the issue of whether the will complies
with the standards at the situs. The statutes, however, frequently adopt
as a reference point the law of the place of execution to the exclusion of the
law of the testator's last domicile. There can be no objection to adopting
the law of the place of execution. The basic purpose of the statutes, no
doubt, is to prevent failure of testamentary dispositions due to the slight
variations in the standards of execution found from state to state. A wide
array of alternative reference points would contribute to that objective. In
view of the traditional importance attached to the law of the testator's last
domicile in wills and administration cases, it would seem that among those
reference points should be included the law of testator's domicile at the
time of death. If that is done, the decree admitting the will in the primary
administration may be accepted as putting at rest any issue of formal
validity in a state whose conflict of laws rule adopts the domiciliary stand-
ards. It must frequently happen, of course, that the place of execution and
the domicile at death will be the same. But, in order to provide for the
case where they are not the same, these statutes should include as one
permissible reference point the law of the last domicile. The old Uniform
Wills Act, Foreign Executed, was conveniently vague, in its reference
to the law of testator's domicile, in not specifying the time of the reference.
As carried into section 7 of the new Model Act, the reference is clear as
to time, but less satisfactory, in that it refers to the time of execution."
73. See discussion of Crippen r. Dexter, pages 2-9-31 supra and State ex rel. Ruel T.
District Court, pages 235-36 supra.
74. See notes 55 and 56 mspra.
75. See note 67 supra.
19441
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
The change in the old Uniform Act made by the Kansas legislature seems
preferable in providing for reference to the law of the domicile "either
at the time of its execution or of the testator's death." 70
One final observation concerning choice of law statutes and recognition
of foreign decrees should be made. Should recognition be extended to
the decrees of all states whose law is adopted as an alternative reference
point under these statutes, or should it be confined to foreign domiciliary
decrees? It is suggested that only a domiciliary probate decree should be
accepted as conclusively establishing the will on all grounds, or as con-
clusively finding it invalid for lack of testamentary capacity or because of
undue influence, fraud, or forgery. If the only issue involved were formal
validity of the will under foreign law, a decree of any foreign court apply-
ing its own law and admitting the will might be accepted as conclusive in
a state whose conflict of laws rule adopts the foreign standard of execu-
tion. But a decree rejecting the will for noncompliance with that standard
would be conclusive only as to that particular reference point, and the will
might still be valid under the local law or under the law of some other
state whose standards are adopted as a reference point under the local
statute. It should also be observed that F-1 may itself have alternative
reference points in its conflict of laws rule. Where F-1 is the domicile, it
would contribute to the conclusiveness of the domiciliary probate when
questioned in F-2 if the conflict of laws rule in F-2 were to include among
its reference points any alternative reference point to which the domiciliary
law might refer. On issues of essential validity, however, the situation is
different. The legal standards are substantially alike throughout the nation,
and the issues are typically issues of fact. It is the purpose of this study to
explore the possibility of establishing a single appropriate forum for final
determination of those issues. Our practice and our legal history point
to the deceased's domicile as that forum. As Professor Page has ob-
served: "If one effectual probate is to be secured, the only probate which
has any chance for general recognition under our law is the probate at
testator's domicile." 77
Another type of legislation which frequently has an important bearing
upon the problem under consideration is legislation providing for the an-
cillary probate or recording of wills upon authenticated copies of the will
and the record of its admission to probate in another state. Every state
has legislation of this kind, but the provisions are extremely varied from
state to state. The basic purpose of all of the statutes seems to be to pro-
vide an alternative method of proof where the original will cannot be
withdrawn from the files of the foreign court. Most of the statutes, how-
ever, contain some provision which declares the effect of admission to an-
76. KAN. Gim. STAT. ANN. (Corrick, Supp. 1941) § 59.609.
77. 2 PAGE, op. cit. supra note 2, at 398.
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ciliary probate or to record, or which leaves an inference of such effect
because of the procedure provided for admission. For present purposes
the statutes can best be classified and discussed with reference to those
two types of provision: those expressly declaring the effect of admission
to ancillary probate or record, and those which provide either for summary
admittance or for notice and plenary hearing in such a way as to suggest
that the foreign decree is or is not conclusive.
In a few states the statutes contain no express provision concerning tile
effect of admittance to local probate or record, but do provide for sum-
mary admittance upon certified record of foreign probate.78  Standing
alone, these statutes by failing to provide for notice and hearing upon an-
cillary probate do not warrant an inference of legislative intent that the
foreign probate be conclusive, since contest through caveat filed after pro-
bate is commonplace in our law, and procedure on ancillary probate usu-
ally follows, in the main, the procedure of original probate. In one of tile
states, in fact, the supreme court construed the statute as relating merely
to proof of a foreign will and said that it had no relevancy to the right to
contest.79 In other states, however, there are related provisions which lend
color to an inference that the local summary probate should be taken as
conclusive,80 thereby leaving no effective opportunity to contest the validity
of the will in the ancillary proceeding. For purposes of the present dis-
cussion, about the best that can be said for tis group of inconclusive
statutes is that they would not have to be amended if another statute were
passed providing for conclusive effect of the probate from a sister state.
In another group of states, the statutes providing for ancillary probate
contain no express provision for notice and hearing, but provide that upon
admittance the will shall have the "same force and effect" as if originally
proved and allowed in this state.8 ' These statutes can be conveniently con-
78. ALA. CODE ANN. (1940) tit. 61, §46 (but if admitted outside the United States
or some territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, it must be probated
as in original proceedings, and may be contested in the same manner); COLO. STAT.
AxN. (Supp. 1942) c. 176, §62a; MoT. RE%. CODES A-xr. (Anderson & 'McFarland,
1935) §§10040, 10041; S. C. Cooy (1942) §§8948-950.
79. Foster v. Kragh, 107 Colo. 389, 113 P. (2d) 666 (1941).
80. See, e.g., ALA. CoDE ANN. (1940) tit. 61, § 46; S. C. CoDE (1942) § 8936. The
latter provides that probate from a foreign country shall not be conclusive as to sanity
of testator or fraud or imposition practiced in obtaining the will, unless it is proved in
solemn form. This leaves open the inference that probate from another state of the United
States, admitted under sections 894S to 8950 inclusive, is not subject to contest.
81. DEL. REV. CODE (1935) § 3711 (relates only to a foreign record of probate at the
domicile; section 3712 provides that when recorded in the county where property is, it
shall be "sufficient evidence") IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1933) § 7.417; KtM.. GE.;.
STAT. ANN. (orrick, Supp. 1941) §§ 59.801, 59.802; MD. ANN. CoDS (Flack, 1939)
art. 93, § 369; N. J. STAT. ANN. (1939) tit. 3, c. 2, § 40; N. M. STAT. A:... (1941)
§ 33.201; Oaio GEx. CODE (Page, 1938) § 10511.5; VA. CODE AN.,;. (Michie, Sublett &
Stedman, 1942) § 5251.
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sidered together with another and larger group which contain the same
provision concerning the effect of local admittance, but differ in that they
do make express provision for notice and hearing prior to ancillary pro-
bate. 2 Included within this larger group are the few states which have
adopted the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated."3 All of these statutes
have a common weakness when examined for their usefulness in con-
tributing to a final domiciliary probate which will be accepted as conclusive
in an ancillary administration. If the will, on ancillary admittance, is to
have the "same force and effect" as if originally proved and allowed local-
ly, it becomes necessary to inquire as to the conclusiveness of a local origi-
nal probate. In many of the states in question contest through some form
of proceeding is permissible for a specified time after an original probate.
If an ancillary probate is to be treated as truly ancillary, there would seem
to be no objection in such a state to giving it a greater degree of conclu-
siveness than would be proper for probate upon an original proceeding.
In other words, the finality of the ancillary decree should be determined
not by reference to the local law relating to an original probate, but by
reference to the foreign primary decree upon which it is based. So long
as the primary decree remains in full force and effect, contest should not
be permitted in the ancillary proceeding. When it is shown in the ancillary
proceeding that the primary decree has been reversed or vacated, the an
cillary decree likewise should be set aside.
Another weakness and uncertainty is found in all of these statutes which
provide for notice and hearing before admission upon authenticated copies
of foreign probate. They do not specify what issues may be presented in
opposition at the hearing. In states where it is permissible to contest a will
on grounds of essential validity before admission when it is offered for
original probate, it is likely, unfortunately, that similar issues will be con-
82. CAL. PROJ. CODE (Deering, 1941) §§ 360-62; CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §4889;
IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 15.220-15.222; LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart., 1939) §§9729-
32; ME. REV. STAT. (1930) c. 76, § 14; MASS. ANN. LAWS (Michie, 1932) c. 192, §§ 9,
10; Nan. Comtp. STAT. (Kyle, Supp. 1941) § 30.225; NEv. ComP. LAWS (Supp. 1941)
§9882.32; N. H. REv. LAWS (1942) c. 351, § 13; N. D. ComP. LAWS ANN. (1913)
§ 8672; ONLA. STAT. ANN. (1938) tit. 58, §§ 51-53; R. I. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1938) c.
572, §§ 10-14; S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 35.0216-35.0218; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams,
1934) §§ 8113-8118 (section 8114 was amended, Tenn. Pub. Acts 1941, c. 63, so as to pro-
vide for ancillary probate either in common or in solemn form; section 8118 expressly
provides for contesting validity of will as to realty in same manner as upon original pro-
bate); UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) §§ 102.3.22-102.3.24; VT. Pun. LAWS (1933) §§2768-
2770; Wis. STAT. (1941) § 310.07 (restricted to foreign record of probate at the domi-
cile); Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1931) §§ 88.301-88.304.
83. 9 U. L. A. (1942) 755. It is particularly regrettable that the Uniform Act con-
tains the deficiencies about to be discussed in the text. Wide adoption of a good uniform
act relating to ancillary probate, providing expressly for recognition of the domiciliary
decree as conclusive on essential validity of the will, would seem to be the most effective
way to prevent wills contests in each of the several states where property is situated.
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sidered open when a will is offered for ancillary probate. It is, of course,
perfectly consistent with a true ancillary probate to permit notice to in-
terested parties and a hearing before admittance, but the issues should be
confined to authenticity and proper authentication of the foreign record,
whether the foreign decree is still in full force and effect, whether there
is local property upon which the will may operate, and other related mat-
ters not inconsistent with recognition of the foreign domiciliary decree
as conclusively establishing essential validity of the will until it is vacated
or nullified in a proper proceeding in the state where entered. Another
critical observation may be made concerning those statutes which provide
for the "same force and effect" as an original probate. All of them, save
those in Wisconsin s 4 and Delaware," accept without discrimination
authenticated probates from any other state without regard to the domi-
cile of the decedent; and many of them accept in like fashion probates from
foreign countries. This is another indication that the objective of the
legislation is to provide an alternative method of proving the will and
that it is not directed to the problem of securing a single final domiciliary
probate where property is in several states. There is no objection, of
course, to this method of proof where a non-domiciliary foreign decree
is involved, but the statutes might well discriminate between the foreign
decrees as to their conclusiveness in the local proceeding. In view of the
above discussion of these statutes, it seems needless to cite and discuss
cases which hold they do not require that a conclusive effect be given
foreign decrees. Before leaving them, however, it should be observed
that in a number of cases the courts have, in fact, placed some reliance
upon them in holding or stating that the foreign decree is conclusive after
local ancillary probate.8
Another group of statutes relating to ancillary probate upon authenti-
cated record of foreign probate expressly provides for contest in the same
manner as wills offered for original probate in the state,87 or within a
84. NWIs. STrr. (1941) §310.07.
85. DEI- REv. CODE (1935) §3711.
86. Murdoch v. Murdoch, 81 Conn. 681, 72 At. 290 (1909); Harris v. Harris, 61
Ind. 117 (1878) ; cf. Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 682, 48 N. E.
592 (1897); Kurtz v. Kurtz's Estate, 169 1d. 554, 182 At. 456 (1936); Babcock v. Col-
lins, 60 Mlinn. 73, 61 N. AV. 1020 (1895) ; State ex rel. Ruef v. District Court, 34 Mont.
96, 85 Pac. 866 (1906) ; Ives v. Heirs of Salisbury, 56 Vt. 565 (183) ; cf. Walton v. Hall's
Estate, 66 Vt. 455, 29 Atl. 803 (1894) ; Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 218 N. 1. 193
(1928) ; In re Gailey's Will, 169 Wis. 444, 171 N. W. 945 (1919).
87. ALAsKA Co-mp. LAWs (1933) §§ 4626-27; Ana. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) §§ 14534,
14557-59; FLA. STAT. A-, x. (1941) §§ 732.30.732.35,732.38; GA. CODE (1938) § 113.702 (as
to real estate, but see section 113.703, providing that if probated in state of testator's resi-
dence, ancillary probate "may be attacked or resisted on the same grounds as other judi-
cial proceedings from a state of the United States") ; ILL_ REv. STAT. (Bar Ass'n Ed.,
1943) c. 3, § 242; IowA CODE (Reichmann, 1939) §§ 11878, 11882; NMISS. CoDE A-=,,.
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specified time after admission." This is the only group of statutes which
clearly and unequivocally precludes the possibility of regarding a foreign
domiciliary probate as conclusive on essential validity of a will when ad-
mitted to ancillary probate. Yet, despite a statute of this kind, the Supreme
Court of Texas has declared that such conclusive effect is required by the
full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution."0 The Court of
Civil Appeals relied upon the statutes in holding that the foreign will was
subject to contest in Texas on the ground of forgery; but the Texas Su-
preme Court virtually ignored the statutes in holding that no contest was
open. If the Supreme Court's premise was correct, it rightly ignored the
statutes as unconstitutional; but, as has been observed, the United States
Supreme Court has not enforced upon the states the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam as a principle of constitutional law in these matters.
The Minnesota statute does not fit readily into any of the above classifi-
cations. It provides for hearing and for notice as in original probate, and
then continues: "If such will was admitted to probate by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction and if the order, judgment, or decree of admission to
probate is still in force, the court shall allow the will and appoint a repre-
sentative as if the will were originally proved and allowed in such court.""
When taken in connection with another provision of the code,91 which pre-
cludes contest on the validity of wills unless objections are filed at or be-
fore hearing for admission, this statute is the clearest legislative directive
which has been found that the foreign probate shall be conclusive. The
inference seems plain that the only issues open upon the hearing for ancil-
lary admission are the validity of the foreign decree and whether it is
still in force. This inference is strengthened by the fact that prior to the
adoption of the statute in its present form, the Minnesota Supreme Court
had said a foreign domiciliary decree was conclusive "and the proceedings
by which it . . . [was] probated in this state . . . mostly a matter of
(1930) § 1614; Mo. REV. STAT. (1939) § 554; ORE. Copt. LAWS AxN. (1940) § 18.703;
TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1934) § 8118 (may be contested as to realty) ; TEx. ANN.
RFV. CIv. STAT. (Vernon, 1941) art. 3352, 8301.
88. ARIZ. CODE ANN. (1939) § 38.216; W. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, Sublett & Sted-
man, 1943) § 4073. The West Virginia statute provides that "any person interested, may,
within two years from the time such authenticated copy is admitted to record, upon rea-
sonable notice to the parties interested, have the order admitting the same set aside, upon
due and satisfactory proof that such authenticated copy was not a true copy of such will,
or that the probate of such will has been set aside by the court by which it was admitted
to probate, or that such probate was improperly made." This statute seems susceptible
to a construction precluding contest on essential validity of the will.
89. Holland v. Jackson, 121 Tex. 1, 37 S. W. (2d) 726 (1931). Another decision
reaching the same result as to personal property, on the same grounds, is Martin v. Sto-
vall, 103 Tenn. 1, 52 S. W. 296 (1899). The dissenting opinion of Wilkes J,, id. at 15,
was on more solid grounds.
90. MINN. STATS. 1941, § 525.271.
91. MINN. STATS. 1941, § 525.241.
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form." 92 The statute at that time provided that the will should have the
same force and effect as if it had been originally proved and allowed in the
same court. For purposes of this investigation, however, the present
Minnesota statute retains one serious defect. It does not discriminate
between a domiciliary and a non-domiciliary decree as to the issues open
in opposition to local admittance.
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR STATUTORY CHANGES
When a decedent leaves property in several states, the lawyer charged
with the task of getting it properly administered is confronted with prob-
lems in the conflict of laws. In a typical case, in accordance with the tradi-
tions of our law, he opens an administration in the state of the decedent's
last domicile. Because of the wide application of the maxim mobilia
sequufltur persoam in decedents' estate matters, he is justified in regard-
ing that administration as the primary one. If an administration proceed-
ing proves to be necessary in another state, however, he must face the
possibility that in many important matters the ancillary court will go its
own way. This study has been concerned with the question whether, in
case there is a will, the domiciliary probate decree may be relied upon as
conclusively establishing the status of testacy or of intestacy for the entire
estate. The answer is that in some states it may be so relied upon and in
other states it may not; in some states it may be relied upon as to personal
property, but not as to real property; in still other states the problem re-
mains in doubt and uncertainty. This conflict and uncertainty is accom-
panied by, and to a large extent caused by, confusion in terminology and
understanding of basic principles.
The greatest source of confusion is to be found in loose use of the term
"jurisdiction." It may mean a number of different things.Y3 It seems to
the writer that basically it should mean the power of a court under its
own law and procedure to hear and determine a controversy in such a way
as to be conclusive within the state, subject only to reversal by a reviewing
court. This conception should include any restrictions which may be en-
forced upon it by the United States Supreme Court under the due process
clause or other provisions of the Constitution since, after all, the Consti-
tution is the supreme law of all the states. It has become customary,
however, to speak of "jurisdiction" as the power to decide a controversy
in such a way that courts in other states and nations will "generally" re-
gard the judgment as conclusive.94 This usage confuses two distinct con-
flict of laws problems, which may profitably be kept distinct. The extra-
territorial effect of a valid judgment should not be considered a problem
92. Babcock v. Collins, 60 Minn. 73, 77, 61 N. V. 1020, 1021 (1895).
93. See 2 PAGE, op. cit. mipra note 2, § 572.
94. See note 6 supra.
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of "jurisdiction," and it should be differentiated from the question of
validity of a judgment in the state of rendition, whether validity is ques-
tioned within or without the state.
This failure to differentiate the problems of jurisdiction and the extra-
territorial effect of probate decrees has resulted in much confusion in ap-
plication of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution to
the probate field. This confusion is frequently worse confounded by fail-
ure to differentiate the additional related problem of choice of law. The
courts in some states, confronted with ancillary administration of the
property of a nonresident decedent, have extended the application of the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personain from the choice of law problem to
the matter of recognition of the domiciliary probate decree. They seem to
feel that such recognition must necessarily follow from the choice of law
rule. Since the common law choice of law rule referred the question of
validity of a will to the rules prevailing at the decedent's domicile as to
personal property and to the law of the situs as to real property, it was
thought to follow that a domiciliary decree was conclusive as to personal
property, but inconclusive as to real property. When the common law
choice of law rule is changed by statute so as to permit an alternative
reference to the law of the domicile, the rule as to recognition is some-
times changed accordingly even as to real estate. The next step in the
reasoning is to say that since the foreign court had "jurisdiction" its
decree must be respected under the full faith and credit clause. This con-
clusion is spurious as applied to a foreign decree operating in rem. It is
spurious because the United States Supreme Court has not required that
such a decree be respected as to property in another state, and it is not
likely to do so. Where, however, the foreign decree also operates in per-
sonam, it is highly probable that it must be respected elsewhere as to all
persons who were parties in F-1 or so represented there as to be bound
in personam.
Other courts, confronted with the same problem, have approached it
from the premise of physical power. It is said that no court has "jurisdic-
tion" over property not within the state. The foreign probate decree, oper-
ating in rem, can have no effect upon local property; and in the absence of
"jurisdiction" the matters determined therein are not entitled to full faith
and credit. It is said to follow that despite the foreign decree, a contest
is open when the will is offered for ancillary probate. While it may be
quite true that full faith and credit as to local property is not required by
the Federal Constitution, the conclusion that a local contest is open does
not necessarily follow. Whether it is open depends upon the common law
or statutory conflict of laws rule in F-2 concerning the effect to be given
the foreign judgment, which, in turn, depends upon the policy of F-2
with respect to the proper function of ancillary administration. If F-2
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decides to go its own way in the matter, there is little that can be done
about it except to change the rule by legislation. If it decides to preclude
litigation upon some or all of the matters determined in F-i, it not only
gives some real meaning to the term "ancillary administration" in estates
matters, but it contributes a great deal to a unified administration of the
entire estate when F-1 is the domiciliary court.
Existing legislation on ancillary probate in some states expressly pre-
cludes a conclusive effect to the primary decree. In most of the states
the legislation is indefinite and does not adequately meet the problem. The
Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated, falls in the latter category. The
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws now have under consideration
tentative drafts for two additional acts relating to powers of foreign repre-
sentatives and ancillary administration of estates. 0 These drafts do not
purport to codify all of the principles of conflict of laws relating to inter-
state administration. The objective is to obviate unnecessary ancillary ad-
ministration and to facilitate a unified administration in cases where an-
cillary administration is desirable. Section 9 of the draft on ancillary
administration deals with the effect of judgments in another jurisdiction,
but it contains no provision concerning the local effect of the foreign
domiciliary probate decree." It is directed solely to the problem of privity
between representatives of the same estate appointed in different states
as to judgments obtained by or against them in the course of administra-
tion. The exclusion from this draft of any provision concerning the effect
to be given the domiciliary probate decree is probably due to the existence
of the Uniform Wills Act, Foreign Probated, the inadequacy of which
has been noted above.
95. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF Co.ussoISN0RS O; U.1. mu
STATE LAws (1942) 237 et seq.
96. Section 9 of the 1942 draft provided in part: "Except in case of fraud in their
procurement, judgments in administration proceedings or in actions by or against any
representative in another jurisdiction shall be as conclusive as to the local representative
or local and foreign representative as if the same were rendered in the administration in
this state, or in actions by or against the local representative or local and foreign repre-
sentative by a court of this state." HANDBoOK OF THE N.TIONAL CONFERE.NCE OF CoW1-
MISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws (1942) 262. It seems clear that the reference in
this section to "judgments in administration proceedings" was not intended to include a
foreign decree of probate. The rest of the sentence, as well as the comment upon the
section by its exceptionally able draftsman, indicated that the problem comprehended was
the matter of privity between representatives of the same estate appointed in different
states as to judgments obtained by or against them in the course of administration. At
all events, it is the heir at law and not a representative who is likely to contest ancillary
probate of a will, and this section provided a conclusive effect only as to representatives.
Any possible ambiguity in the scope of the section has been eliminated from the 1943 draft
by exclusion of the reference to "judgments in administration proceedings." NX,%ro:;z.,
CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, REPORT or ScECaAL COMMIT-
TEE ON UNIFORM ANcILLARY ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATEs Acr (1943) 12.
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Legal reforms usually come slowly and often piecemeal; but despite the
opposition which may be expected to the limited objectives of these tenta-
tive drafts, it would seem that while the Commissioners are considering
improvements in the law of ancillary administration, they might well in-
clude the problem of conclusiveness of the domiciliary probate. In a
sense, the problem is a crucial one going to the very basis of the proper
function of ancillary administration. Perhaps a simple legislative directive
on that matter requiring recognition of the domiciliary decree would serve
to extricate the courts from their entanglement in conflicting theories of
"jurisdiction," and set them on their way toward a more simple and unified
administration of an estate extending across state lines.
The precise form of such a model statute precluding wills contests upon
ancillary probate would depend upon other related provisions of the pro-
bate code. The following suggestions merely relate to a few of the matters
a draftsman of ancillary probate legislation should have in mind.
In most states the statutes quite properly permit ancillary probate upon
authenticated record of a foreign proceeding without regard for the testa-
tor's domicile. This provides a convenient method for proving a will which
is in the files of a foreign court and may not be readily available. For
reasons heretofore suggested, however, it is believed that only a domiciliary
decree should be accepted as conclusively establishing the will. Not only
would such discrimination contribute to a unified administration centered
at the domicile, but it would prevent effectuation of fraud. It may be as-
sumed that anyone who has procured a will in his favor by undue influence
or fraud, or who has forged a will would not hesitate to propound the
document in some state where the testator left property and where pros-
pective contestants would be least likely to anticipate production of a will.
Production of a will at the domicile, however, may always be anticipated;
and it seems appropriate for that reason to make the discrimination and
to accept the domicile as the one appropriate jurisdiction for a final deter-
mination of validity of the will. In case the decedent's domicile is in dis-
pute, that question would be an issue of fact for determination when pro-
bate is requested upon foreign authenticated record. Under present law
a decree finding local domicile is not regarded as conclusive in other states
on persons not parties to the first proceeding and is not entitled to full
faith and credit under the Constitution. It is usually said that domicile
is a "jurisdictional fact" which may be questioned in F-2 under the rule
that in F-2 the jurisdiction of F-1 is always open to inquiry. Domicile
usually is not a jurisdictional fact, however, in the sense in which "juris-
diction" is used herein. The presence of property in F-1 provides an ade-
quate basis for probate in that state. Whether the finding of domicile is
correct or erroneous, it is ordinarily not subject to collateral attack in the
97. For an extensive collection of cases, see Note (1939) 121 A. L. R. 1200.
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state where entered, and as to parties bound by the decree in personam as
well as in rem, it is probably not subject to collateral attack elsewhere.
But domicile often is, and always should be, a crucial fact in determining
what recognition is to be give a foreign decree upon wlich local adminis-
tration is founded. No ex parte determination of that fact by a foreign
court should be conclusive in .F-2 in case of conflicting claims of domicile.
In view of the existing law, it should be unnecessary to provide expressly
by statute that a foreign decree fixing domicile is not conclusive on that
question, although such a provision might be useful in preventing mis-
application of a statute providing for recognition of a foreign domiciliary
decree.
Under existing practice, both statutory and common law, it usually is
permissible to admit a foreign will to original probate in a non-domiciliary
state where property subject to the will is situated, although it has not been
presented for probate at the domicile. 8 This practice seems desirable and
should not be changed;'9 but its retention suggests the question whether
it should be extended to the case of a will presented for probate at the
domicile, rejected there, and then offered for original probate in another
state. The answer is clearly that it should not if the domiciliary court is
accepted as the appropriate forum for final determination of the status
of testacy or intestacy. The ancillary probate statutes, however, are not
applicable to this question. If, as has been suggested, the matter of recog-
nition is handled by a provision in the ancillary administration code to the
effect that the domiciliary decree upon which ancillary administration is
founded be accepted as conclusively establishing the status of testacy, then
it would be necessary to draft a companion statute. Such a statute should
provide, in effect, that original probate of a foreign will shall not be per-
missible where it has been rejected at the domicile on grounds of essen-
tial invalidity.
98. For an extensive collection of cases, see Note (1939) 119 A. L. R. 491.
99. A contrary rule, requiring that foreign wills be admitted at the domicile as a
prerequisite to probate in another state, would force needless domiciliary probate in
cases where there is no property at the domicile; and, furthermore, where a will fails
because of noncompliance with domiciliary standards of execution, it would consequently
fail at the situs as well, although executed in compliance with the standards there. An
illustration of the latter difficulty may be found in In re Dodge's Will, 89 N. J. Eq. 525,
104 Ati. 646 (1918). The testator died domiciled in Georgia, having previously
executed a will in compliance with New Jersey law while domiciled in New Jersey. The
will was refused probate in Georgia because not executed with the requisite formalities
of Georgia statutes. There was real property in New Jersey upon which the will oper-
ated, but the New Jersey court refused to admit the will on the ground that under its
statutes there could be no original probate of the will of a testator domiciled outside New
Jersey even though the will was sufficient in form to pass New Jersey property. Soon
after the decision the rule of New Jersey was changed by statute. See N. J. RE,. ST,sT.
(1937) tit 3, c. 2, §41.
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Rejection at the domicile on the grounds of formal invalidity, however,
should not preclude original probate elsewhere. Existing choice of law
statutes usually permit alternative reference points as to standards of
formal validity. One of those reference points should be the law of testa-
tor's domicile; and, in that event, a decree admitting the will at the domi-
cile could be conclusive on issues of formal as well as essential validity.
But rejection of the will at the domicile for formal invalidity should not
preclude probate elsewhere of a will executed in accordance with local
standards or the standards of some other reference point permissible
under the local choice of law rule. In view of the policy of our law, of-
ten expressed in the cases favoring liberty of testation, there would seem
to be no justification for abandoning the present choice of law statutes,
which permit alternative reference points for rules of formal validity,
and requiring execution in accordance with the domiciliary standards.
The underlying principles governing the ceremony of wills execution
are substantially alike in all the states, but there is great variety in the
details. The minor differences often lead to an unfortunate partial in-
testacy where property is situated in several states. Provision for alterna-
tive reference points would seem the best way to meet the situation until
such time as the states are able to agree upon a standard ceremony, such as
the one found in the Model Execution of Wills Act recently offered by
the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
100
Where a will has been denied probate at the domicile on the ground that
it has been revoked, the courts in other states are confronted with other
problems in proper correlation of choice of law rules and the effect to be
given to the domiciliary decree. The common law choice of law rules re-
ferred the matter of revocation to the law of the domicile as to personal
property and to the law of the situs as to real property. Concerning revoca-
tion by subsequent act of the testator, the common law rules have been
found too restrictive in a number of states; and the statutes provide the
same alternative reference points for a valid revocation as are provided
for standards of formal validity. These statutes are applicable to both real
and personal property.1"' What has been said above in regard to correla-
tion between choice of law on standards of formal validity and the effect
of the domiciliary decree would seem to be equally applicable here. A poli-
cy of liberty of testation should include the liberty of intestacy, and the
testator's purpose in that regard should not be defeated by minor technical
differences in formal standards of revocation in the several states. A
draftsman with a broad mandate to reform the law of ancillary adminis-
tration might well consider the advisability of providing alternative ref-
100. 9 U. L. A. (1942) 277.
101. MONT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §6988; N. D. Com'.
LAws ANN. (1913) § 5653; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1938) tit. 84, §§ 71-72; S. D. CODE
(1939) § 56.0212; UTAH CODE ANN. (1943) § 101.1.14.
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erence points for standards of revocation and providing as one of the per-
missible reference points the law of the testator's last domicile. If that is
done, a will denied probate at the domicile because revoked under the domi-
ciliary law would not be entitled to probate in another state, and the domi-
ciliary decree rejecting the will would be conclusive on that issue. A
domiciliary decree, however, which admits a will after finding an attempted
revocation ineffective, would not preclude a showing in the ancillary ad-
ministration that the will had been revoked as to local property in accord-
ance with provisions of the local law.
Where the problem is revocation by operation of law rather than by
subsequent act of the testator, the considerations of policy involved are
quite different. Liberty of testation is obstructed, not by minor formal
differences in standards of execution and revocation, but by limitations
designed to protect dependents from thoughtless or intentional exclusions
on the part of the testator. As usual, the common law rules referred this
problem to the law of the testator's domicile as to personal property and
to the law of the situs as to real property. 2 There seems to be little dis-
position to change these rules either by statute or- decision. So long as
they are followed, a domiciliary decree should be entitled to recognition as
to personal property and not as to real property on the issue of revocation
by operation of law."03 A draftsman of legislative reform, however,
might have to weigh the local policy concerning revocation by operation
of law against the policy of giving a conclusive effect to a foreign domi-
ciliary decree on that issue. He would find available at least one precedent
for change. The Wisconsin Supreme Court extended the implications of
its ancillary probate statute beyond its express requirements and gave the
foreign domiciliary decree a conclusive effect as to existence and validity
of a will. It held that a will of Wisconsin land which was denied probate
at the domicile because revoked by subsequent marriage of the testator,
was not entitled to probate in Wisconsin, even though marriage without
issue was not a revocation under Wisconsin law.
0 4
It should not be inferred from the somewhat detailed suggestions sub-
mitted above that a complete statutory system of ancillary probate is ad-
102. In re Smith's Estate, 55 Wyo. 181, 97 P. (2d) 677 (1940) (indicating that one
source of conflict of laws problems is the difference in rule among the states as to whether
a woman's iill is still, as at common law, revoked by marriage alone without the birth
of issue).
103. Evansville Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Winsor, 148 Ind. 62, 48 N. E. 592 (1897);
Barnes v. Graves, 259 Ky. 180, 82 S. NV. (2d) 297 (1935); Sneed v. Ewing, 5 J. J. Mar.
460 (Ky. 1831); Cohen v. Herbert, 205 Mo. 537, 104 S. NV. 84 (1907); Cornell v. Burr,
32 S. D. 1, 141 N. W. 1081 (1913); cf. Crossett Lumber Cu. v. Files, 104 Ark. 00,
149 S. W. 908 (1912).
104. It re Galley's kVill, 169 XVis. 444, 171 N. NV. 945 (1919); cf. In rc Hebblewhite's
Will, 228 XVis. 259, 280 N. NV. 384 (1938) (construction of foreign will).
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vocated. Perhaps no draftsman could anticipate and provide a complete
solution for all of the complex problems of choice of law and recognition
of foreign judgments and the correlations between the two which might
arise in interstate administration. These suggestions are intended to aid
in placing those problems into proper focus with reference to the under-
lying problem of "jurisdiction," which has been the source of most of
the confusion in the past. A simple legislative directive to the effect that
in ancillary administration the domiciliary decree shall be given a conclu-
sive effect as to existence and validity of a will might be adequate to set
the courts upon a course of true ancillary administration. The great con-
structive traditions of the common law might then be relied upon for re-
examination and possible modification of common law choice of law rules.
